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INTRODUCTION
Enrichment without cause was introduced into the Louisiana Civil
Code as revised Article 2298.1 As indicated in the revision comments,2 this
provision codified preexisting jurisprudence that had imported the theory

1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2018); Act No. 713, § 1, 1995 La. Acts No.
1041 (codified as LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (1996)). The Quasi-Contracts Committee
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, chaired by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos,
prepared the initial draft of this revised Article. See Cheryl Martin, Louisiana State
Law Institute Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio and Codification of Unjust
Enrichment, 69 TUL. L. REV. 181 (1994).
2. Art. 2298 cmt. a.

2018]

DEMYSTIFYING ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE

1225

of actio de in rem verso,3 together with the mysteries4 of this theory’s
jurisprudential past.
Generally, liability for enrichment without cause requires a
displacement of wealth in favor of the enriched obligor at the expense of
the impoverished obligee. Morever, this displacement is not justified by
the will of the parties or by operation of law.5 The remedy provided is
subsidiary. It is intended to restore this patrimonial imbalance while at the
same time rectifying the inequity of the situation pursuant to the moral
directives of equity and commutative justice.6
This Article explores two mysteries surrounding the theory of
enrichment without cause that still bedevil scholars and the courts—the
theory’s foundation and its scope of application. Part I examines the
history, characteristic features, and underlying principles of enrichment
without cause as a source of obligations and a special expression of the
more general principle of unjustified enrichment.7 Part II applies this
3. In France, the actio de in rem verso was introduced in the seminal decision
of the Cour de cassation in the Boudier case. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] req., June 15, 1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E.
Labbé (Fr.); HENRI CAPITANT ET AL., 2 LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE
CIVILE, OBLIGATIONS, CONTRATS SPECIAUX, SURETES No. 241 (13th ed. 2015) (Fr.).
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the actio de in rem verso in the landmark
cases Minyard v. Curtis Prod., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967) and Edmonston v. ASecond Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974). ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA
LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN QUASI-CONTRACTS 344, 355–60 (1991).
4. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Presentation to the Civil Law Property Students at the
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law: Mysteries of the Louisiana Civil
Code (Oct. 19, 2015), https://vimeo.com/143021101 [https://perma.cc/V3DW8L8K] (discussing “truths, half-truths, and falsehoods” of Louisiana civil law).
5. Scott v. Wesley, 589 So. 2d 26, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“The root
principle of an unjustified enrichment . . . is that the plaintiff suffers an economic
detriment for which he should not be responsible, while the defendant receives an
economic benefit for which he has not paid.”).
6. See 9 CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANÇAIS No. 578 (Etienne Bartin ed., 5th ed. 1897–1923).
7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1757, 2298. Courts often use the terms
“unjust(ified) enrichment” and “enrichment without cause” interchangeably.
These two terms, however, should be distinguished. “Unjustified enrichment” is
a general principle of law, whereas “enrichment without cause” is a specific
source of obligations. This Article does not discuss the general principle of
unjustified enrichment, the expression of which is found in several areas of the
law, including enrichment without cause. See DIG. 12.6.14 (Pomponius, Ad
Sabinum 21) (“For it is by nature fair that nobody should enrich himself at the
expense of another.”) and DIG. 50.17.206 (Pomponius, Ex Variis Lectionibus 9)
(“By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury
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historical and comparative information in an attempt to decipher the
precise scope of application of enrichment without cause in Louisiana law,
in hopes that this contribution will prompt a more general discussion on
the formulation of a coherent Louisiana model of enrichment without
cause.8
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE
The foundation of enrichment without cause is the first mystery to
explore. This mystery is an ancient one, dating back to a historical
misunderstanding among early French and German jurists as to the
meaning of certain Roman legal concepts. Exploring these Roman
concepts and this French-German misunderstanding will perhaps help
solve this first mystery.
A. Roman Law Foundations
The historical foundation of enrichment without cause, as a modern
source of obligations, is traced back to Justinian and his Corpus Iuris
Civilis.9 The compilers of the Roman texts enunciated the principle of
unjustified enrichment based on two actions of the classical Roman
period—the condictio and the actio de in rem verso.

of another.”); cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2055; Vernon V. Palmer, The Many
Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in
Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 42–47 (1994) (referring to unjustified enrichment
as an example of the application of the principle of equity by Louisiana courts);
David W. Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV.
57, 64 (2005) (using the principle of unjustified enrichment as an example of a
principle of law interacting with practice). Also, this Article does not cover issues
concerning the consequences of enrichment without cause.
8. In essence, this Article attempts to uncover hidden truths, clarify halftruths, and dispel falsehoods concerning the mysterious actio de in rem verso. See
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4.
9. Translated texts from the Digest are taken from THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985). Translated texts from the Institutes of
Justinian are taken from THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES (12th rev.
ed. 1917) (1898). Translated texts from the Institutes of Gaius and from
Justinian’s Code are taken from SAMUEL P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (1932).
Bracketed terms are additions by the author. Translations from the original texts
in French, German, and Greek are by the author.
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1. Condictio and Actio de in Rem Verso
A substantive concept of enrichment without cause was unknown in
classical Roman law.10 Instead, Roman lawyers had developed several
actions intended for the restoration or restitution of displaced wealth.11 The
modern concept traces its roots to two such nominate actions of the
classical Roman law—the condictio and the actio de in rem verso.12
The condictio authorized recovery by the plaintiff of a certain object
or money in the hands of the defendant.13 The condictio was an abstract
action.14 The plaintiff was not required to state the cause for his demand.15
In its early form, the condictio was restricted to the recovery of identifiable
objects or money16 found in the hands of the defendant without just
cause.17 The purpose of the condictio was restoration in the strictest sense:
10. MICHAEL STATHOPOULOS, AXIOSIS ADIKAIOLOGITOU PLOUTISMOU
[CLAIM OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT] 2 (1972) (Greece) [hereinafter
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT].
11. See Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and
Louisiana Law: Part I, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (1962) [hereinafter Nicholas
I]; 1 GEORGE PETROPOULOS, HISTORIA KAI EISIGISEIS TOU ROMAIKOU DIKAIOU
[HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW] 610–14 (2d ed. 1963, reprinted 2008)
(Greece) [hereinafter PETROPOULOS I].
12. See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1042–43; Shael Herman, The
Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum Louisiana, 56 LA.
L. REV. 257, 276–80 (1995) (comparing the civil and common law history of the
general principle of unjustified enrichment).
13. See MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 293–97 (1927).
14. ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN
REPUBLIC 10 (1965, reprinted 1984); LEOPOLD WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE
ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 166 (Otis Harrison Fisk trans., rev. ed. 1986);
PAUL FRÉDÉRIC GIRARD, MANUEL ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 649 n.1 (Félix
Senn ed., 8th ed. 1929).
15. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 10; WENGER, supra note 14, at 166;
GIRARD, supra note 14, at 649 n.1.
16. Condictio dare oportene certam rem. Later, the action also included
incorporeal things, such as obligations [causa liberationis]. See FRITZ SCHULZ,
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 614 (1951); 2 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE
PRIVATRECHT § 270 (2d ed. 1975).
17. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 419 (2006)
[hereinafter GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS] (citing Windscheid “a person was liable for
‘a thing which he has without just basis [justa causa]’” and DIG. 25.2.25, 12.7.1.3).
In classical Roman law, the term causa, when used to describe the condictio, was
not a technical term of art. Depending on the context, causa referred to the Latin
word for “reason,” “situation,” or specific objects—res. See RADIN, supra note 13,
at 297–300; SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 203, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
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an object held by the defendant without lawful cause ought to be returned
to the plaintiff who had never lost ownership of this object.18 The element
of enrichment was noticeably missing from the original concept of
condictio, although in most cases the defendant was indeed enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff by withholding the object in question.19
Especially for the cases of enrichment of a master caused by his
servant’s acts or transactions, a special and very specific remedy was
given—the actio de peculio,20 which later developed into the praetorian
actio de in rem verso.21 This praetorian action was a causal action,
meaning that the plaintiff bore the burden of specifying the cause for his
demand.22 Since its inception, this action directly entailed the element of
restitution of assets that had exited the patrimony of the plaintiff and
entered the defendant’s patrimony through the acts of the defendant’s

TREATISE (1969) [hereinafter LIVTINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I]. Aristotle identified four
types of cause: matter—material cause; form—formal cause; agent—efficient
cause; and purpose—final cause. Aristotle, Physics II.3 192–95. Causa finalis was
eventually adopted under the civilian theory of cause. See CHRISTOS FILIOS, H AITIA
STIS ENOCHIKES SYMVASEIS [THE CAUSA CONTRAHENDI] 30, 101–25 (2007)
(Greece); cf. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 292–93 (discussing Aristotle’s
influence on the postglossators’ theories of cause).
18. See MAX KASER, DAS ALTRÖMISCHE JUS 286–88 (1949). The defendant
in a condictio was considered a borrower who was charged with returning the
object. The resemblance of the Roman condictio to the modern-day loan for use
(commodatum) and consumption (mutuum) is striking. See id. at 287; cf. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. arts. 2891, 2901 (2018). The affinity of the early condictio with the
loan contract also explains the legal nature of the obligation of compensation for
enrichment without cause. This obligation attaches to the acquirer of the enrichment,
thus resembling a propter rem obligation, or a “real obligation,” to refer to the
inaccurate term of art that has prevailed in France and Louisiana. See GASTON MAY,
ELÉMENTS DE DROIT ROMAIN 416 (18th ed. 1935). For a discussion of real
obligations, see generally A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 9:29, in 2 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY]; A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: Part I, 23 LA. L.
REV. 161 (1963); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative
Law: Part II, 23 LA. L. REV. 618 (1963); L. David Cromwell & Chloé Chetta,
Divining the Real Nature of Real Obligations, 92 TUL. L. REV. 127 (2017).
19. See 2 HENRY JOHN ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW IN THE TIMES OF CICERO
AND OF THE ANTONINES 76–77 (1902, reprinted 1975).
20. DIG. 15.1.41 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43).
21. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 710–11, 715–16.
22. See ROBY, supra note 19, at 245–46; WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 533–34, 536 (2d ed. 1932)
[hereinafter BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK].
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servant.23 It is aptly said, therefore, that this action more closely resembles
modern concepts of unjustified enrichment, especially in civilian systems
modeled after the Code Napoleon.24
The idea of unjustified enrichment appeared at the time of the Corpus
Iuris Civilis.25 A general principle of restitution for unjustified enrichment,
based on notions of Aristotelian commutative justice26 and Christian
values,27 appeared in the Digest.28 This general principle of law later
influenced several Roman institutions29 of property and obligations law.30

23. Thus, a typical actio de in rem verso imposes liability on the defendant
master who was enriched at the expense of the plaintiff third party through the acts
of the master’s servant. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS:
ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 878–84 (1990, reprinted 1992);
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 6–7.
24. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 878–84; STATHOPOULOS,
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 6–7; PAUL JÖRS & WOLFGANG
KUNKEL, RÖMISCHES PRIVATRECHT 267 (3d ed. 1949).
25. See GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 419.
26. Id. at 12, 424; see also JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS
OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 10–11, 30–31 (1991, reprinted 2011)
[hereinafter GORDLEY, ORIGINS].
27. See JOHN DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
52–53 (1951); ULTRICH VON LÜBTOW, BEITRÄGE ZUR LEHRE VON DER CONDICTIO
NACH RÖMISCHEN UND GELTENDEM RECHT 22–24 (1952).
28. See DIG. 12.6.14 (Pomponius, Ad Sabinum 21) (“For it is by nature fair
that nobody should enrich himself at the expense of another.”) and DIG. 50.17.206
(Pomponius, Ex Variis Lectionibus 9) (“By the law of nature it is fair that no one
become richer by the loss and injury of another.”); see also GEORGES RIPERT, LA
REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 249 (4th ed. 1949).
29. See Gruning, supra note 7, at 64 (using the principle of unjustified
enrichment as an example of a principle of law interacting with practice).
30. For example, the regulation of the rights and obligations of the owner visà-vis a possessor of a thing is based on precepts of unjust enrichment. See infra note
234. Likewise, the restitution interest in the area of the law of conventional
obligations is a manifestation of the principle of unjust enrichment. Cf. SAÚL
LITVINOFF, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 14:2, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d
ed. 2001) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, DAMAGES]; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936); see also 2
BORIS STARCK, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS, CONTRAT ET QUASI CONTRAT, RÉGIME
GÉNÉRAL No. 1797 (Henri Roland & Laurent Boyer eds., 2d ed. 1986) (referring to
accession, improvements by possessors, community property, nullity especially for
incapacity, payment of a thing not due, and improvements made by lessees as
expression of the general principle of unjustified enrichment).
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This principle also augmented the Roman nominate actions, adding to
them the element of enrichment.31
The condictiones were grouped into nominate categories.32 Thus, a
condictio could be instituted when the plaintiff had given a thing or
money: (a) in contemplation of a future result that did not follow;33 (b) for
a reason disapproved by law or repugnant to public policy;34 (c) by mistake
because payment was not actually due;35 or (d) without a good reason for
the transaction.36 Further, the actio de in rem verso gradually developed
and expanded to cover instances in which third parties were enriched at
the expense of the impoverished obligee.37 More importantly, enrichment
without cause was recognized as a source of obligations under the heading
of “quasi-contract.”38
31. See Werner Flume, Der Wegfall der Berwicherung in der Entwicklung
vom römischen zum geltenden Recht 103, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS
NIEDERMEYER (Universität Göttingen ed., 1953).
32. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 838–57; CARL SALKOWSKI, INSTITUTES
AND HISTORY OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 682–85 (E.E. Whitfield trans., 1886,
reprinted 1994); FREDERICK TOMKINS & HENRY JENCKEN, A COMPENDIUM OF
THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 396–401 (1870, reprinted 2000).
33. DIG. 12.4 (condictio causa data causa non secuta—otherwise known as
condictio ob causam datorum). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1048–49.
34. DIG. 12.5 (condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam). See PETROPOULOS
I, supra note 11, at 1048.
35. DIG. 12.6 (condictio indebiti). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1044–48.
36. DIG. 12.7 (condictio sine causa). See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at
1049. This type of condictio seems to be a residual category, encompassing
situations in which the enrichment was attributed to a cause that had expired
(causa finita—see DIG. 12.7.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32)) or where the enrichment
itself was not a thing given by the plaintiff but a promise made by the plaintiff,
from which he is now seeking a release (causa liberationis—see DIG. 12.7.1
(Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43) and 12.7.3 (Julian, Digestorum 8)). See STATHOPOULOS,
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 3–4.
37. DIG. 17.2.82 (Papinian, Responsorum 3); CODE JUST. 4.26.7 (Diocletian
& Maximian 290/293) (actio de in rem verso utilis). See 2 GEORGE PETROPOULOS,
HISTORIA KAI EISIGISEIS TOU ROMAIKOU DIKAIOU [HISTORY AND INSTITUTES OF
ROMAN LAW] 1146–47 (2d ed. 1963, reprinted 2008) (Greece). See generally
ANDREAS VON TUHR, ACTIO DE IN REM VERSO (1895).
38. J. INST. 3.13 (“A further division separates [obligations] into four kinds,
for they arise either from [contract, quasi-contract, delict, or a quasi-delict].”).
Gaius had initially identified contracts and delicts as sources of obligations and
later added quasi-contracts and quasi delicts as “other sources.” See DIG. 44.7.1.pr
(Gaius, Aureorum 2) (“Obligations arise either from contract or from
wrongdoing, or by some special right from various types of causes.”) (emphasis
added). Traditionally, the heading of quasi-contract included the management of
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The concept of unjustified enrichment, as an institution of substantive
law, is therefore a product of Justinian’s law. It is an amalgamation of
Roman pragmatism with equitable considerations and moral principles of
Greek philosophy.39 Although this body of law was well received by the
post-glossators40 and eventually by the European civil codes, the compiled
texts were less than clear about the requirements and scope of application
of enrichment without cause.41 The foundation of enrichment without
cause is one of its mysteries, tracing its roots to conflicting interpretations
of a passage written by the Roman jurist Ulpian concerning the cause—
causa—of contracts.

affairs of another [negotiorum gestio]; tutorship [tutela] and curatorship [cura];
co-ownership [communio incidens]; and enrichment without cause [condictiones
and actio de in rem verso]. See WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW § 123 (2d ed. 1953, reprinted 1981) [hereinafter BUCKLAND,
MANUAL]; WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF THE ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW No. 133 (1912) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES]; 2 BERNHARD
WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 421 (7th ed. 1891);
FERDINAND MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW § 491 (Moses Dropsie
trans., 8th ed. 1883); RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 83 (James Crawford Ledlie
trans., 3d ed. 1907, reprinted 1994); WILLIAM BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW 476–84 (1938, reprinted
1989); PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 1035–50.
39. This expansion of Roman ideas occurred through several interpolations
and misinterpretations of Roman texts. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 13.
40. See FRÉDÉRIC ZENATI-CASTAING & THIERRY REVET, COURS DE DROIT
CIVIL: CONTRATS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE, QUASI-CONTRATS No. 226 (2014)
(discussing the efforts of Baldus to enunciate a general and unitary action of
enrichment without cause).
41. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 611 (“The classical law was sound and
cleverly contrived in spite of some gaps which ought to have been filled in; but
the compilers have completely ruined the classical law. They unwisely extended
the scope of these actions and unhappily modified their content by numerous
interpolations which have obscured and confused the classical law without giving
a clear exposition of the Byzantine law. [Unjust enrichment] law is one of the
worst parts of Justinian’s law; it has confused and irritated generations of lawyers
and exercised an evil influence on continental codifications down to our times.
The German Civil Code (BGB) is a warning example.”).
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2. Ulpian’s Causa
In the classical Roman law of obligations, the concept of causa42 was
marginal because of the strict formalism in the creation of contracts.43 The
significance of cause slowly began to emerge during the post-classical
period and became more evident during the Middle Ages when the
heightened formality requirements for contracts were gradually reduced,
thus enabling the speedier and more informal formation of contracts.44
This shift toward informality, however, created a void in contract law and
theory concerning the requirements for the validity of contract.45 This gap
was filled by the civilian theory of cause as it is known today. In short, the
old formalism was replaced with causality in contemporary contract law.46
This movement is evidenced in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, in which
several excerpts, original or interpolated older texts, emphasizing the
causa of conventional obligations began to appear.47 Perhaps the most
notable and debated48 excerpt comes from Ulpian’s “Commentary of the
Edict.”49

42. Cause of conventional obligations is a topic extensively discussed and
debated elsewhere. See, e.g., LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, §§ 196–
242; Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28
YALE L.J. 621 (1919). For the purposes of this Article, the discussion adopts the
prevailing theory of cause as accepted in Louisiana. See Saúl Litvinoff, Still
Another Look at Cause, 48 LA. L. REV. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Cause].
43. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 471; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra
note 17, § 202; John Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV.
2, 4 (1951).
44. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 553.
45. See SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 471; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra
note 17, § 208; Smith, supra note 43, at 4.
46. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 208; Smith, supra note 43, at 4.
47. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 25–35.
48. Id. at 2–3; see also WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR,
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 229–30 (Frederick H. Lawson, 2d rev. ed. 1952)
(referring to Ulpian’s excerpt as “the famous passage on which the whole theory
of cause was based” and noting that “[it] was taken to mean that every contract
must have a cause, [when] in reality [it] says nothing of the kind”); GORDLEY,
ORIGINS, supra note 26, at 49–50; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, §
205; Lorenzen, supra note 42, at 624–25.
49. DIG. 2.14.7 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 4).
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In this text, Ulpian refers to certain innominate “synallagmatic50
contracts” in which agreed performances were exchanged by the parties.51
These contracts, not belonging to the recognized nominate types of
contracts,52 generally were not actionable under classical Roman law.53
Ulpian suggests that these contracts may, nevertheless, become actionable
if they have a causa. In Digest 2.14.7.4, Ulpian writes, “when no [causa]
exists, it is settled that no obligation arises from the agreement.”54 As
Ulpian explains, the term causa here refers to the fact that one of the
parties has already performed.55 Thus, if the innominate contract is
executory, the fact that one party performed will give rise to an action
demanding that the other party perform.56
Centuries passed, Roman formalism was abandoned completely, and
the need for an updated commentary to Ulpian’s text became necessary.57
Two prominent jurists formulated their decisive theories relying on
conflicting interpretations of this same passage—the French judge and
jurist Domat and the German law professor Savigny.

50. The term refers to the Aristotelian “synallagma,” which means an equal
trade of performances. See also DIG. 50.16.19 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 11) (using the
Greek work synallagma to describe a transaction). This term ultimately found its
way into the Greek, French, and Louisiana civil codes as a synonym for bilateral
contracts. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1908 (2018).
51. Under this type of agreement, the parties exchanged promises to give, do,
or not do something (do ut des, facio ut facias, do ut facias, and facio ut des). See
BUCKLAND, MANUAL, supra note 38, § 119; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra
note 17, § 200. This Roman category of contracts is the precursor to modern
commutative contracts. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1911.
52. The nominate contracts of the classical period included the contracts
verbis, litteris, re, and consensus. See PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 873–1000
(providing a detailed discussion of all Roman nominate contracts); Ronald J.
Scalise, Jr., Classifying and Clarifying Contracts, 76 LA. L. REV. 1063, 1068–72
(2016) (providing an overview of the Roman categories of contracts).
53. See MACKELDEY, supra note 38, §§ 443–448; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at
522–24; BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK, supra note 22, at 521–22; GORDLEY,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 291.
54. See F.P. Walton, Cause and Consideration in Contracts, 41 L. Q. REV.
306, 312 (1925) (explaining that an innominate contract without a cause is an
unenforceable nudum pactum).
55. Id. at 311.
56. See BUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, No. 104; LITVINOFF,
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 205.
57. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 37–73 (discussing in detail the development
of the notion of cause in the ius commune era).
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B. European Civil Codes—The French-German Separation
Domat interpreted Ulpian’s text expansively and enunciated his theory
of cause, which formed the basis of the French model of unjustified
enrichment, also applicable in Louisiana.58 Savigny, on the other hand,
construed this text more narrowly and formulated his theories of
abstraction and separation, from which the German model of unjustified
enrichment emerged and was later expanded by German and Greek legal
scholars.59
1. The French Model—Causality and Actio de in Rem Verso
In France and Louisiana, restitution for enrichment without cause is
restricted to cases in which the several requirements for the actio de in rem
verso60 are met.61 The Roman condictiones, on the other hand, were not
developed62 because restoration is achieved through the expanded theories
of cause and nullity of juridical acts.63 This French model of unjustified
enrichment traces its roots to Domat’s reading of Ulpian.

58. Id. at 69–71.
59. Id. at 80–86.
60. This name was given to the action in a judgment of the Court of Appeal of
Rennes of August 28, 1820, and, according to several scholars, it should not be
confused with the action that bore the same name in Rome. See DAWSON, supra
note 27, at 98 n.101; Paul Roubier, La position française en matière
d’enrichissement sans cause, in 4 TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION CAPITANT 38, 44
(Association H. Capitant ed., 1948); 9bis CHARLES BEUDANT & PAUL LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE, COURS DE DROIT FRANÇAIS No. 1751 n.2 (R. Rodière ed., 2d ed.
1951–52); Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 619. Nevertheless, it is submitted here that
the modern actio de in rem verso does bear some similarity with its ancient ancestor,
predominantly because both refer to restitution as a remedy and are causal in nature.
See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 17.
61. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 370–427.
62. With the exception of the condictio for a payment of a thing not due
(condictio indebiti), which was included in the civil codes of Louisiana and
France. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 p. 320 (1808); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2279 (1825); LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2301 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2299 (rev. 1995); LEVASSEUR,
supra note 3, at 145–232; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1376 (1804)
(Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1302 (rev. 2016) (Fr.).
63. See Roubier, supra note 60, at 42; J.-B. BÉGUET, L’ENRICHISSEMENT
SANS CAUSE No. 26 (1945); STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra
note 10, at 18–19.
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In his treatise,64 Domat enunciates the French theory of cause.65
Commenting on Ulpian’s passage mentioned above, Domat quickly
dispenses with the Roman categorization of contracts, and in its place he
identifies four types of contracts based exclusively on the former
innominate category66 of the Roman law.67 Referring to the Roman
category of innominate contracts as controlling in his classification of
contracts, Domat then directly cites Ulpian in Digest 2.14.7.468 when
stating that “no [contract69] is obligatory without a causa.”70 Cause,
therefore, is proclaimed a mandatory requirement for the validity of all
contracts.71
At first blush, it seems that the logical sequence of Domat’s reliance
on Ulpian is faithful and, perhaps, unoriginal.72 A closer examination of
his treatise reveals, however, that Domat radically departs from Ulpian and
revolutionizes contract theory in two important respects.73 First, Domat
furnishes a fundamentally different definition of causa. According to the
French jurist, causa is not the fact that one of the parties has already
performed, as Ulpian suggested—rather it is the obligation of the other

64. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 161 (William
Strahan trans., Luther Cushing ed., 1853).
65. 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, pt. 1, Nos. 1029–32
(La. State L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959, reprinted 2005) [hereinafter 2 PLANIOL I];
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 209. German and Greek legal
scholars, on the other hand, recognize several nominate categories of objective
cause dating back to Roman law. These categories include the following causes:
to receive a counter-performance from the other party—causa credendi or
acquirendi; to fulfill a preexisting obligation—causa solvendi; to make a gift,
liberal cause—causa donandi; to renew an obligation by novation—causa
novandi; and, arguably, to create a trust—fiduciae causa. See 2 ANDREAS VON
TUHR, DER ALLGEMEINE TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS II, § 72,
at 67–80 (1918); GEORGE BALIS, GENIKAI ARCHAI TOU ASTIKOU DIKAIOU
[GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW] § 34 (8th ed. 1961) (Greece); LITVINOFF,
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 245.
66. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
67. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 161; BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK, supra note 22, at
522–23.
68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69. A precise translation from the French original is “covenant.” DOMAT,
supra note 64, at 161.
70. Id. at 161–62.
71. See Litvinoff, Cause, supra note 42, at 5–6.
72. One author suggests that Domat’s views simply expressed the prevailing
opinion in French law of that time. See Walton, supra note 54, at 315.
73. FILIOS, supra note 17, at 69–71.
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party to perform.74 This definition accords fully with the meaning of
objective cause as it is known today.75 The party obligates herself because
she looks forward to receiving the other party’s performance and not
because the parties followed a ceremonial form or the other party
performed first.76
Second, Domat expressly dismisses Roman formalism and brings
forward a consensual form of contracting.77 By doing so, he effectively
broadened the concept of causa by removing it from the strict domain of
formal validity of contracts and placing it within the purview of the
doctrine of nullity. Indeed, a contract with no extant and valid cause is an
absolute nullity.78
More importantly, and returning to the topic of enrichment without
cause, Domat cites the excerpts of Justinian’s Digest on condictio sine
causa79 alongside Ulpian’s passage to support his theory of cause.80 This
reference has been interpreted to mean that the Roman condictiones are
instances of an inexistent or faulty causa and, therefore, ought to be

74. See HENRI CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 166–67 n.1 (3d ed.
1927). According to French scholars, Domat’s expansive reading of Ulpian was
justified because of the elimination of the earlier formal contracts of the classical
Roman law. See 3 C.B.M. TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, TITRE III Nos. 166173 (Duvergier ed., 6th ed. 1846–48). On the development of the doctrine of cause
in French law, see 2 AMBROISE COLIN & HENRI CAPITANT, COURS ÉLEMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 57 (Julliott De La Morandiere ed., 8th ed. 1935);
12 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & LOUIS J. BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DES OBLIGATIONS, VOL. 1 No. 300 (3d ed. 1906); 6
MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANÇAIS, DES OBLIGATIONS, PART 1 No. 250 (Paul Esmein et al. eds., 1930).
75. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1908 cmt. b (2018) (“The doctrine of
cause makes the obligations arising out of a bilateral contract correlative. In such
a contract, indeed, the obligation of each party is the cause of the other.”)
(emphasis added); CAPITANT, supra note 74, at 6; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I,
supra note 17, §§ 208–209.
76. FILIOS, supra note 17, at 69–70. As a result, the causa finalis replaced the
causa efficiens in contract theory, as Bortolus and Baldus had previously advocated.
See supra note 17; see also GORDLEY, ORIGINS, supra note 26, at 49–51.
77. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 209.
78. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 162, 191; COLIN & CAPITANT, supra note 74,
No. 62.
79. DIG. 12.7 (de condictione sine causa). See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
80. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 162. See CAPITANT, supra note 74, 166–67 n.1.
Cf. PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 87 (2003) (arguing in favor of a remedy
for restitution on the basis of the defendant’s enrichment sine causa).
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governed by the provisions on nullity.81 This observation admits at least
one exception—the payment of a thing not due,82 which is treated
separately under the heading of quasi-contract.83
Domat’s theory later appeared in the writings of Pothier,84 who in turn
referred solely to the condictio indebiti as a separate action, thus tacitly
placing all other condictiones under the scope of the doctrine of nullity.85
Although Domat’s theory of cause found its way into the civil codes of
France86 and Louisiana,87 the notion of enrichment without cause remained
forgotten and uncodified,88 only to be discovered in the 19th and 20th
centuries in French textbooks89 and the jurisprudence of France and

81. 2 GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS,
vol. 1 No. 347 (1962).
82. Condictio indebiti. DOMAT, supra note 64, at 595–603. Domat also seems
to include the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam in his discussion of quasicontract, id. at 599, although this type of condictio clearly falls within the ambit
of unlawful cause. For a definition of these categories of condictio, see supra
notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
83. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1371 (1804) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1300 (rev. 2016) (Fr.); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2293 (1870,
repealed 1995). See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 9–15 (critiquing the concept of
quasi-contract at civil law).
84. See 1 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS
CONSIDERED IN A MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW 28–33, 72–73 (Francois-Xavier
Martin trans. 1802, reprinted 1999); DAWSON, supra note 27, at 95–98;
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, §§ 210–211.
85. See ANDRE MOREL, L’EVOLUTION DE LA DOCTRINE DE L’ENRICISSEMENT
SANS CAUSE. ESSAI CRITIQUE 34–36 (1955); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 883.
86. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1108, 1131–1133 (1804)
(Fr.). It is noteworthy that the requirement of cause has been removed from the
French Civil Code in the latest 2016 revision. Though many commentators
describe this revision as a “revolution,” the concept of cause as a mandatory
requirement still appears in the revised provisions. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.]
[CIVIL CODE] arts. 1162, 1169 (2018) (Fr.); see also Solène Rowan, The New
French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 805 (2018).
87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 31 p. 264 (1808); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1887 (1825); LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1893 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1966 (rev. 1984).
88. J.-M. Augustin, Introduction historique à l’enrichissement sans cause en
droit français, in L’ENRICHISSEMENT SANS CAUSE: LA CLASSIFICATION DES
SOURCES DES OBLIGATIONS 31 (V. Mannino & C. Ophèle eds. 2007).
89. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 6, No. 578. Their theory on enrichment
without cause first appeared in the 4th edition of their treatise (1869–1876) and was
adopted by the French Court of Cassation in the Boudier case. See supra note 3.
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Louisiana under the heading of quasi-contract.90 Eventually, the
jurisprudence was codified in Louisiana91 and, quite recently, in France.92
The implications of Domat’s theory of cause to the foundation and
scope of application of the modern actio de in rem verso can be understood
fully in light of the theory of juridical acts.93 In France and Louisiana, all
patrimonial juridical acts are causal, that is, dependent upon the validity

90. 2 JACQUES FLOUR, JEAN-LUC AUBERT & ERIC SAVAUX, DROIT CIVIL, LES
OBLIGATIONS, LE FAIT JURIDIQUE No. 34 (14th ed. 2011) [hereinafter FLOUR ET AL.,
FAIT JURIDIQUE]; FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT
CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS No. 1063 (11th ed. 2013); PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT
AYNES & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS No. 1057 (7th ed. 2015).
91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (rev. 1995) (enrichment without cause).
For a more detailed account of the history of quasi-contract in Louisiana, see
Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, Part II,
37 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1962) [hereinafter Nicholas II]. For an analysis of quasicontract under Louisiana law, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 26–52.
92. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1303, 1303-1, 1303-2, 1303-3, and 1303-4 (rev.
2016) (enrichissement injustifié) (Fr.). See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié,
Généralités, Conditions matérielles No. 1, JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1303 à 1304-4,
Fascicule 10, Jun. 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017). In essence, Louisiana lawyers accomplished
with one concise article that was drafted more than 20 years ago to codify enrichment
without cause more efficiently compared to the five new and debated articles in the
French Civil Code. On this topic, the student has become the teacher!
93. A juridical act is defined as a “manifestation [or declaration] of will intended
to have legal consequences.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 492 cmt. b (2018). A juridical
act “may be a unilateral act, such as an affidavit, or a bilateral act, such as a contract.
It may be onerous or gratuitous.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3471 cmt. c. According to
Litvinoff and Tête, based on a systematic categorization of civilian topics, juridical
acts can be patrimonial or extra-patrimonial—personal. Patrimonial juridical acts are
those that involve
the creation, modification o[r] extinction of rights of a pecuniary value .
. . . Thus, a sale . . . or the letting out of services for a fee or stipend, are
examples of juridical acts that are patrimonial. Those juridical acts are
extra-patrimonial which involve rights that escape a pecuniary
evaluation, or, to use a different technical terminology, are out of
commerce. Such is the case with family rights and the so-called rights of
personality. Thus, marriage, adoption, emancipation, are all examples.
SAÚL LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE
CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 140 (1969); 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE
CIVIL LAW pt. 1, Nos. 264–66 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959, reprinted
2005) [hereinafter 1 PLANIOL I]; 1 BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES
PANDEKTENRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 69 (Theodor Kipp ed., 8th ed. 1900);
BALIS, supra note 65, § 32.
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of their cause.94 In principle, patrimonial juridical acts are also unified95 in
the sense that they combine personal elements—for example, a promise to
transfer ownership—and real elements—for example, conveyance of the
object of the contract.96 Nullity of the juridical act is retroactive,97 meaning
that the parties’ patrimonies are restored to the situation that existed prior
to the formation of the null act.98 In the example of a null contract of sale,
ownership of the thing sold reverts back to the seller, and the buyer’s

94. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, Nos. 1042–46.
95. With reference to a contract of sale, see id. No. 1416.
96. As noted, civilian doctrine classifies juridical acts into several categories,
depending on different factors. Based on their object, patrimonial juridical acts,
for example, can be personal or real. As Professor Yiannopoulos explained,
Personal juridical acts are those that create, transfer, alter or terminate
obligations. Real juridical acts are those that create, transfer, alter, or
terminate real rights. . . . Quite frequently, both kinds of juridical acts
are combined in a single transaction. The sale of property, for example,
involves a personal juridical act—the promise to transfer ownership, as
well as a real juridical act—the delivery or transfer of possession.
A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW
449 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM]. Depending
on their effects, patrimonial juridical acts can be promissory or dispositive.
A promissory juridical act contains merely a promise to render a
performance and gives rise to an obligation to give, to do, or not to do
something . . . . A dispositive juridical act effects a disposition, namely,
a transfer, alteration, encumbrance, or termination of a right . . . . The
notion of a personal juridical act is broader than that of a dispositive
juridical act. Indeed, a personal juridical act may involve the transfer or
termination of an obligation, namely, a disposition, as in the case of the
remission of a debt.
Id. (emphasis added). These categories must be examined separately; however,
there is a degree of overlap between them. All real juridical acts are dispositive.
All promissory juridical acts are personal. Most personal juridical acts are
promissory but not all.
97. In other words, a juridical act is null ex tunc. In some instances, however, a
prospective, ex nunc, effect of nullity coupled with an award for damages is
warranted. Such is the case, for example, in contracts of continuous or periodic
performance like a lease. Because restoration in kind obviously is impracticable, an
award of damages ought to be granted instead. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 para.
1 (2018). This principle also appears in the Louisiana Civil Code for cases of
dissolution of contracts and effects of conditions. Id. arts. 1776, 2019. See SAÚL
LITVINOFF, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 5.12, in 5 LOUISIANA. CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d
ed. 2001) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL].
98. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033.
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ownership of the tendered price is restored.99 Because of the retroactive
effects of nullity, the putative buyer is now possessing or detaining a thing
that she no longer owns.100 Thus, the putative seller is entitled to bring a
real action to revendicate the thing in the hands of the putative buyer.101 It
should be clear that an action for enrichment without cause would be
inadmissible in this case. The reason for this inadmissibility is that the
general rule prohibiting enrichment without cause must yield to the more
specific rules of nullity and subsequent revendication.102 The French
approach of unity and causality initially focuses on the protection of the
contracting parties and then affords protection to third parties when
necessary.103
As a result, in Louisiana and France, the modern doctrines of cause104
and nullity105 govern situations of restoration with the exception of the
quasi-contractual claim for restoration of a payment of a thing not due.106
Delictual actions lie for the recovery of damages as a result of an offense or
a quasi-offense.107 The remaining cases of restitution may fall within the
purview of an actio de in rem verso, that is, enrichment without cause.108
The fact remained, however, that the actio de in rem verso dwelled
outside the civil codes and legal theories of France and Louisiana. When
this action was discovered in the seminal French arrêt Boudier of the
French Cour de cassation,109 it was received with skepticism by scholars,

99. Id. The same result is obtained in the case of dissolution of the sale. Id. art.
2018; DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID W. GRUNING, SALES §§ 15:9, 15:16, in
24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012).
100. Art. 2033. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 13:14.
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 526; see YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note
18, §§ 11:7, 13:7, 13:13.
102. According to a long-standing maxim, lex specialis derogat lege generali,
meaning “the special law overrides the general law.” See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239.
103. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035. See Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Rethinking the
Doctrine of Nullity, 74 LA. L. REV. 663, 684–85 (2014) (discussing the effect of
nullity on third persons).
104. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1966.
105. Id. art. 2029.
106. Id. art. 2299.
107. Id. art. 2315. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 13:13.
108. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298.
109. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 15,
1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E. Labbé (Fr.) (impoverished provider
of fertilizer performed at the request of an agricultural lessee on the land of the
enriched lessor and subsequently claimed compensation from the lessor after the
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starting with Labbé, who was the first to criticize the decision for its overly
broad and “dangerous” application of a general principle of law.110 The
courts were receptive to this criticism and added juridical requirements to
the admissibility of the action, thus restricting and demoting it to a
subsidiary action.111 Several contemporary French scholars believe that
this restrictive trend has perhaps gone too far, and the action has been
unduly constrained.112 The same can be said with regard to the seminal
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.113

lessee became insolvent). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Nicholas I, supra
note 11, at 622–24.
110. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June
15, 1892, D. 1892, 1, 596, S. 1893, 1, 281, note J.-E. Labbé (Fr.); see also ALAIN
BÉNABENT, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 484 (14th ed. 2014); Nicholas I, supra
note 11, at 624–26.
111. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May
12, 1914, S. 1918, 1, 41, note Nayret (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] civ., Mar. 2 1915, D. 1920, 1, 102 (Fr.).
112. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 56; see also MALAURIE
ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1058 (arguing that the contours of unjust enrichment
have been perhaps unduly restricted to a particular category of persons, including
those persons who have common interests within the outskirts of a legal
patrimonial relationship, such as unmarried partners, spouses under a separate
property regime, a child attending to an elderly parent, and parties to an inexistent
contract). According to Dawson, the inherent suspicion toward jurisprudential
rules may have been an additional factor prompting an undue restriction of this
action. See DAWSON, supra note 27, at 105 (“[I]t is a difficult matter for courts to
introduce large-scale correctives, by case law methods, into a system of codified
law.”). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that jurisprudence constante is a
venerated civilian institution and, at least in theory and by some courts, a
recognized primary source of law in the form of a custom. See YIANNOPOULOS,
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 149–52. In any event, codification of this
action in Louisiana and France has rendered this debate moot.
113. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (1967) (providing that a
subcontractor brought contractual “action in indemnity” against a third party whose
fault triggered the payment of damages in the absence of another remedy at law). For
a detailed commentary to the decision, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 403–08; Saúl
Litvinoff, Work of the Appellate Courts—1976–1968, Obligations, 29 LA. L. REV. 200
(1969) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Appellate Courts]; Albert Tate, The Louisiana Action
for Unjustified Enrichment, 50 TUL. L. REV. 883 (1976) [hereinafter Tate I]; Albert
Tate, The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment. A Study in Judicial Process,
51 TUL. L. REV. 446 (1977) [hereinafter Tate II]; John St. Claire, Actio de in Rem
Verso in Louisiana: Minyard v. Curtis Products Inc., 43 TUL. L. REV. 263 (1969);
Robert Fritz, Note, Sales—Article 1965—Civil Law Action of Unjust Enrichment: De
in Rem Verso, 14 LOY. L. REV. 434 (1968). It is noteworthy that the Court based its
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and Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co.114 A proper understanding of
the historical foundations and the general principles of enrichment without
cause should eliminate tendencies to broaden unduly or restrict the scope
of application of this remedy. The French/Louisiana approach also is better
understood if compared with the German/Greek model of unjustified
enrichment.
2. The German Model—Abstraction and Condictio
Ulpian’s passage115 received a different reading and commentary
under the German jurist Savigny.116 While Domat adopted an expansive
reading of Ulpian’s excerpt, Savigny construed this passage quite
narrowly.117 Savigny noted that Ulpian’s passage referred only to the
innominate contracts and not to the nominate contract of stipulatio.118
decision on the general provisions of the 1870 Civil Code on equity—former Articles
21 and 1965, current Articles 4 and 2055—and not on the more germane provisions
on quasi-contracts—former Articles 2293 and 2294, which were repealed in the 1995
revision. See Barry Nicholas, The Louisiana Law of Unjustified Enrichment Through
the Act of the Person Enriched, 6 TUL. CIV. L. F. 3, 10–13 (1991–1992) [hereinafter
Nicholas III]; Tate I, supra, at 894 (arguing in favor of basing the action on former
Article 21); Tate II, supra, at 458–60 (discussing the difficulties associated with
basing the action on former Article 21). Codification of this action now renders this
point moot. But see Bruce V. Schewe & Vanessa Richelle, The “New and
Improved” Claim for Unjust Enrichment—Codified, 56 LA. L. REV. 663, 669
(arguing in favor of the subsidiarity principle on the basis of Article 4 of the
Louisiana Civil Code on equity).
114. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974) (describing
how landowner brought action of enrichment without cause against second
mortgagee when first mortgage was discharged by payment of life insurance
benefits). For a detailed commentary, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 408–11;
Stewart McCaa Thomas, Conditions For the Application of Actio De In Rem Verso,
36 LA. L. REV. 312 (1975); Charles Verderame, Unjust Enrichment Remedy: Actio
de in rem verso, 21 LOY. L. REV. 219 (1975).
115. DIG. 2.14.7.4 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 4). See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
116. 2 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS TEIL
DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 249, 253–54 (1853) [hereinafter SAVIGNY,
OBLIGATIONS]; ARCHIBALD BROWN, AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF SAVIGNY’S
TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW 122–24 (1872).
117. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 249, 253–54; BROWN, supra
note 116, at 122–24.
118. The stipulatio was the most widely known and used nominate contract.
Originally, it was a verbal (verbis) contract formed in a ceremony of a question
and answer between the parties. Later, the stipulatio was designated a mandatory
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From this, Savigny posited that the stipulatio is an abstract contract, that
is, a contract that is valid notwithstanding the invalidity or inexistence of
its causa.119 This radical proposition laid the foundation for the recognition
of abstract juridical acts120 in the German and Greek civilian systems under
the principle of abstraction.121
Based on this observation of the abstract nature of the stipulatio,
Savigny then turned his attention to the traditio. Under Roman law,
traditio was the act of delivery of a corporeal thing.122 Traditio was a
causal act in the classical period123 but had become abstract by the time of
the Corpus Iuris Civilis.124 Faithful to the Roman system, Savigny
distinguished sharply between the promissory element of a transaction and
the dispositive element of the same transaction, thus enunciating the
famous theory of separation.125 Savigny then characterized the traditio as
written form. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 1–9; SCHULZ, supra note 16, at 473–
83; PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 873–86; GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 17, at 290.
119. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 249, 253–54; BROWN, supra
note 116, at 122–24; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 91–92.
120. A juridical act is abstract when the validity of the act is independent of
the validity or existence of its cause. Most promissory juridical acts are causal.
Conveyance of movables, assignment of rights, and remission of debts are popular
examples of abstract dispositive juridical acts that remain valid notwithstanding
the invalidity of their cause. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note
96, at 449–51; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 248.
121. “Abstraktionsprinzip.” See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 80–86; BASIL
MARKESINIS ET AL., THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT, A COMPARATIVE
TREATISE 27–37 (2d ed. 2006); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 866–68.
122. The term “tradition” is used in contemporary civilian theory and its
application appears in modern civil codes. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
722, 2477 (2018).
123. A valid cause of tradition, iusta causa traditionis, was required for the
validity of the transfer of a thing. PETROPOULOS I, supra note 11, at 676–78.
124. Id.; see also DIG. 41.1.9.3 (Gaius, Rerum Cottidianarum sive Aureorum
2); J. INST. 2.1.40 (accepting the validity of a transfer of property without
reference to an underlying cause).
125. “Trennungsprinzip.” See 3 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES
HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 312–13 (1840); see also J.B. MOYLE, THE
CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW 3, 110, 135 (1892, reprinted 1994)
(discussing the difference between the Roman promissory concept of sale with
the English sale as an “ipso facto transfer of property” and citing DIG. 50.16.67
and CODE JUST. 2.3.20); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 271–72. The promissory
act usually serves as the principal and objective cause of the dispositive act, while,
through the dispositive act, the obligation incurred in the promissory act is
discharged. See MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 27–37.
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a dispositive and abstract juridical act and the stipulatio as a promissory
and abstract juridical act.126
The potential inequities produced by the disassociation of cause from
the validity of these abstract juridical acts are mitigated by recourse to the
doctrine of unjustified enrichment.127 Savigny postulated that the several
Roman abstract condictiones, if read together, stand for the proposition of
a general action of unjustified enrichment as a condictio generalis, which
ought to be available if the actual cause of an abstract juridical act is
inexistent or invalid.128
Savigny’s theory was commented on and further elaborated by Jhering
and was eventually incorporated in the modern German and Greek civil
law.129 As a result, the concept of unjustified enrichment is considerably
broader and more frequently invoked in Germany and Greece to address
issues of restitution as well as restoration for failed juridical acts.130
German and Greek legal doctrines base their theory of unjustified
enrichment on the Roman condictiones from which a general action of

126. SAVIGNY, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 116, at 255–77 and note m. On the
distinction between promissory and dispositive juridical acts, see supra note 96.
In essence, if an abstract juridical act involving transfer of property fails upon
performance, the transferee will maintain ownership of the thing. See MICHAEL
STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW IN GREECE 50 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter
STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW].
127. BALIS, supra note 65, § 65.
128. 5 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN
RECHTS 503, 522–23, 526–27, 567 (1841); Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 611. As
Professor Yiannopoulos explained,
A debtor sued for the performance of obligations undertaken by [an
abstract] juridical act may not defend the action on the ground that the
juridical act was without cause or that its cause was immoral or illegal.
The harshness of this solution is mitigated by application of the principle
of enrichment without cause. In certain circumstances, the debtor may
avoid performance of an obligation he has assumed by raising the
exception of lack or unlawfulness of cause and, if he performed, he may
reclaim whatever he paid by an action grounded on the unjustified
enrichment of the defendant.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 450.
129. See FILIOS, supra note 17, at 83; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at
11–13. The German approach of separation and abstraction is aimed initially at
protecting third parties and the public trust but also endeavors to protect the
contracting parties when deemed necessary. See DIETER MEDICUS, ALLGEMEINER
TEIL DES BGB, No. 226 (8th ed. 2002); STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 126, at 50–51.
130. See 1 MAX KASER, DAS RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT § 139.3 (2d ed. 1971).
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unjustified enrichment131 appeared in the German132 and Greek133 civil
codes. Nevertheless, several German scholars134 questioned the effectiveness
of a unitary remedy to govern such a multitude of cases.135 Following this
trend, German legal doctrine distinguishes between several nominate types of
enrichment.136
The two most prominent German categories of enrichment are enrichment
because of a performance rendered by the obligor to the obligee137 and
enrichment occurring in some other way.138 Proponents of this categorization
also argued in favor of the application of a different subset of rules for each
category.139 This strict categorization of the types of enrichment only prompted
further debate and was not particularly helpful for the courts.140
One celebrated example of the overcomplicated German doctrine of
unjustified enrichment is the “air-travel case.”141 A 17-year-old boy
131. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 20–22.
132. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 812 (2018) (Ger.);
Martin Schwab, in 5 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGELICHEN GESETZBUCH
§ 812 (Franz Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013); GERHARD DANNEMANN,
THE GERMAN LAW OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 3–20 (2009); ZIMMERMANN,
supra note 23, at 887–91 (1990, reprinted 1992).
133. ASTIKOS KODIKAS [AK] [CIVIL CODE] art. 904 (2018) (Greece); Michael
Stathopoulos, Arthro 904 [Article 904], in 4 ASTIKOS KODIX, KAT’ ARTHRO
ERMINEIA, EIDIKO ENOCHIKO [CIVIL CODE COMMENTARY, SPECIAL LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS] (Apostolos Georgiades & Michael Stathopoulos eds., 1982)
(Greece); STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 243–57.
134. Most notably, see WALTER WILBERG, DIE LEHRE VON DER
UNGERECHTFERTIGEN BEREICHERUNG NACH ÖSTERREICHISCHEM UND DEUTSCHEM
RECHT—KRITIK UND AUFBAU (1934); Ernst von Caemmerer, Grundprobleme des
Bereicherungsrechts, in ERNST VON CAEMMERER: GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 370 (H.G.
Leser ed., 1968); Ernst von Caemmerer, Problèmes Fondamentaux de l’enrichissement
sans Cause, 18 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ 573 (1966).
135. See GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 419–21, 426–32;
STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 22–27; Nicholas I,
supra note 11, at 614–17.
136. See DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 21–44; BIRKE HÄCKER,
CONSEQUENCES OF IMPAIRED CONSENT TRANSFERS 25–35 (2009).
137. “Leistungskondiktion.” See DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 45–74.
138. “Nichtleistungskondiktion.” See id. at 87–122. This broad subcategory
encompasses cases of restitution not based on performance rendered by the impoverished
obligee. The most notable example is the enrichment occurring from the enriched obligor’s
interference with the impoverished obligee’s patrimony (Eingriffskondiktion). Id.
139. See STATHOPOULOS, CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 247–48.
140. Id.
141. “Flugreisefall.” Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 7,
1971 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 609, 1971 (Ger.). Partial translation
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somehow managed to board a flight from Hamburg to New York without a
valid ticket.142 His plot was unraveled when the aircraft arrived in New
York, and immigration officials denied him admission into the United
States.143 The airline then presented a written agreement to the boy to fly
him back to Germany.144 The boy signed the agreement, and when he
returned to Germany, he refused to pay.145 The airline brought suit against
his parents.146 Under German law, the contract signed by the minor for the
return flight was absolutely null;147 the airline did maintain a claim,
however, against the parents on the basis of negotiorum gestio for the return
flight to Germany.148 But what about the outbound flight to New York? The
court found that the boy had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the
airline.149 The boy’s parents were ordered to make restitution for the cost of
the airfare regardless of the fact that the boy did not retain his enrichment150
and that he was a minor.151
available in DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–49; see also MARKESINIS ET AL.,
supra note 121, at 235–36.
142. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36.
143. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36.
144. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36.
145. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36.
146. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 242–45; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36.
147. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 245–49; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36. In Louisiana, the contract would be relatively null at the behest
of the minor. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1919, 2031 (2018).
148. DANNEMANN, supra note 132, at 245–49; MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note
121, at 235–36; cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292.
149. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 236.
150. Id. (“[A] change of position . . . cannot be invoked if the debtor knew that
he was not entitled to the service.”). The problem of change of position concerns
the consequences of the action of enrichment without cause, which are not examined
in this Article. See generally James Gordley, Restitution without enrichment?
Change of position and Wegfall der Bereicherung, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT,
KEY ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227 (David Johnston & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2002); GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 433–44.
151. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 121, at 236. The facts of this case clearly
indicate an enrichment and a corresponding impoverishment. Yet these facts still
prompted extended controversy among German commentators as to the precise nature
of the enrichment. Was this flight “provided” to the boy by the airline or did the boy
“interfere” with the airline’s patrimony? Was the airline actually impoverished?
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Greek legal doctrine has followed a more flexible and practical
approach.152 Based on German theory, Greek scholars acknowledge three
basic types of enrichment: (1) performance or other benefit conferred on the
enriched obligor at the expense of the impoverished obligee; (2) enriched
obligor’s interference with the impoverished obligee’s patrimony; and (3)
expenses incurred by the impoverished obligee on the property of the
enriched obligor.153 The same scholars recognize, however, that these
categories are flexible, may overlap, and are intended solely for practical
use and ease of reference rather than strict categorizations warranting a
separate regulation.154 This approach will be used when discussing the
requirements for the action of enrichment without cause.
A comparison of the French and German models of unjustified
enrichment will become more evident by reference to an example: if X
sells her bicycle to Y and, upon delivery of the bicycle, X discovers that
the cause of the contract of sale was false155 or illegal,156 X can bring an
action for annulment of the contract.157 In France and Louisiana, the
juridical act of sale typically encompasses both the promise to transfer
ownership and the conveyance of the bicycle. The validity of the cause is
a mandatory requirement for the validity of this sale. As a result of the
nullity of the contract of sale, ownership of the bicycle will revert back to
X, who can now revendicate the bicycle in Y’s hands by instituting a real
action and not an action for enrichment without cause.
In Germany and Greece, however, this transaction contains two
distinguishable juridical acts—the promise to sell and the dispositive act of
conveyance. The dispositive act is abstract and, therefore, nondependent
upon the validity of the promissory act of sale. Invalidity of the former act
therefore will not affect the validity of the latter act. Thus, Y remains owner
of the bicycle and is immune to any real actions for its recovery. But because

Obviously the boy took an empty seat on the airplane—a seat that was not reserved or
used by anyone else. Finally, what was the boy’s enrichment? Did he retain this
enrichment, having been flown back to Germany? Cases such as this one illustrate the
futility of the attempt to strictly categorize the cases of enrichment. In Louisiana, these
facts would possibly fall within the scope of the tort of conversion and, therefore, a
delictual action would be available. See infra notes 239, 241.
152. STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 37–39.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1948 (2018).
156. Id. art. 1968.
157. Naturally, if the contract is relatively null, the action is for rescission of
the contract. If the contract is absolutely null, an action for a declaratory judgment
is initiated. See id. arts. 2030, 2032.
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Y has no just cause to retain this enrichment in her patrimony, X will be
entitled to reclaim the bicycle on grounds of unjustified enrichment.
From this illustration, it should become clear that both systems
provide for the recovery of property that has been conveyed without “just
cause.” Each system, however, arrives at this result via different routes.
What is accomplished by the German approach of unjustified enrichment
is equally achieved by the French doctrines of cause and nullity. In other
words, the German device of unjustified enrichment is broader than the
French enrichment without cause. Conversely, the French doctrines of
cause and nullity are broader than the German theory of invalidity of
juridical acts. Understanding the history and characteristics of the
French/Louisiana model of enrichment without cause will prove useful
when formulating the general principles for the application of this remedy.
II. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE
The second mystery to be explored is the precise scope of application of
the theory of enrichment without cause. Louisiana and French courts have
delineated this scope of application by enunciating several requirements for
this remedy. This jurisprudence has been codified.158 These requirements are
explored with reference to general principles drawn from the characteristics
of the French model of enrichment without cause. Discussion refers to
Louisiana jurisprudence and solutions reached by French courts. German and
Greek ideas compatible with the French/Louisiana model are also used.
A. General Principles
Solving the first mystery concerning the foundation of the theory of
enrichment without cause reveals three characteristic features of this theory:
(1) the general and residual character of the remedy; (2) the legal source of
the obligation; and (3) the concept of restitution. Exploring and understanding
these features is necessary before addressing the requirements for application
of the theory of enrichment without cause.
1. Enrichment Without Cause as Lex Generalis
The first principle derived from the characteristics of the French/Louisiana
model of enrichment without cause is the general nature of the remedy.159
Courts steadily characterize enrichment without cause as a “gap-filling” device
of equitable origin, having exceptional application, pursuant to a judicially
158. Id. art. 2298.
159. See Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 606–07.
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crafted principle of substantive subsidiarity.160 Perhaps a more accurate
description of this characteristic feature can be found in the civilian maxim
of statutory construction, lex posterior generalis non derogat priori
speciali.161 As discussed above, the French approach to enrichment
without cause focused primarily on the doctrines of cause and nullity of
juridical acts. Nevertheless, enrichment without cause was given
exceptional application, which, according to another civilian maxim,
exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis,162 should be interpreted strictly.
Therefore, application of the provision of Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil
Code must yield to more specific rules on cause, nullity, and dissolution of
juridical acts, as well as legal rules on delictual or quasi-delictual liability.
In essence, expression of the general principle of unjustified enrichment
is found in the doctrines of cause and nullity as well as in the concept of
enrichment without cause. When it comes to restoration, the former rules
are lex specialis.
2. Enrichment Without Cause as a Juridical Fact
Scholars have advanced several theories concerning the legal nature
of enrichment without cause.163 These theories can be separated into two
broad categories. The first category includes theories claiming that
enrichment without cause is a form of quasi-delict, generating legal
obligations on the basis of the acts of the enriched obligor.164 The second
160. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 243, 244 (La. 2010)
(citing Mouton v. State, 525 So. 2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1988)); Bd. of Sup’rs
of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 2008); see
also Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648, 657 (La. 1996); Coastal Env’t
Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Intern., Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[W]here there is a rule of law directed to the issue, an action must not be allowed
to defeat the purpose of said rule. . . . Stated differently, unjust enrichment principles
are only applicable to fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is provided.”).
161. A posterior general law does not abrogate the provisions of a prior special
law. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239.
162. Exceptional provisions are not susceptible of expansive interpretation or
analogous application. See id. at 258.
163. SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 259, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(1975) [hereinafter LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II]; André Rouast, L’enrichissement
sans cause et la jurisprudence civile, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV]
1922, p. 35.
164. See 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 937; Litvinoff, Appellate Courts,
supra note 113, at 207–08; Georges Ripert & Michel Teisseire, Essai d’une
théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL
[RTDCIV] 1904, p. 727 (arguing that the legal basis for unjustified enrichment can
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category comprises theories proposing that enrichment without cause is
quasi-contractual in form, thus generating an obligation as if there were
an implied contract between enriched obligor and impoverished obligee.165
The quasi-delictual theories are historically more accurate and closer
to the true and original legal nature of the Roman law condictiones.166
These theories, however, focus too much on the subjective element of the
obligor’s behavior, thus failing to account for cases in which the obligor
is held strictly liable for her enrichment.167 The quasi-contractual theories

be found in the theory of risks); Stephen Smith, Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to
Tort than Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 181 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009); Reihnard Zimmermann,
Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 403, 403–04 (“The law of unjustified enrichment, in a way, is the mirror
image of the law of delict.”).
165. Aubry and Rau adopted this approach by advancing their special theory
of balancing the patrimonies between the enriched obligor and the impoverished
obligee. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 6, No. 578; see also Nicholas III, supra
note 113, at 6–10 (discussing the dilemma between delict and quasi-contract in
the pre-Minyard Louisiana jurisprudence).
166. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 4–6
(explaining that the early condictiones were focused solely on the act of
enrichment and sanctioned an illicit misappropriation of wealth).
167. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 938; BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE,
supra note 60, No. 1759; 2 GEORGES RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER, TRAITÉ
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL No. 1275 (1952); 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES
RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, LES OBLIGATIONS, PT. 2, No. 752 (Paul Esmein et al.
eds., 1931); 2 LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS No. 758 (3d
ed. 1939) (all arguing that admissibility of the actio de in rem verso is independent of
the capacity or incapacity of the defendant). Protection of the incapable obligor is
warranted, however, when assessing the effect of a successful claim of enrichment
without cause. It has been suggested that in the case of an incapable enrichee, restitution
ought to be made on the assets that remain in the hands of the enrichee, if there is no
fraud on his part. See 2 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, VOL. 1,
OBLIGATIONS, THEORIE GENERALE No. 711 (François Chabas ed., 8th ed. 1991).
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appeared later and prevailed in doctrine,168 jurisprudence,169 and the
law.170 The real difficulty with this group of theories lies in the imperfect,
and much debated, definition of the term “quasi-contract.”171 Further, this
group of theories focuses mainly on the objective factor of enrichment

168. Unjustified enrichment has been compared to a special and implied type of
loan between the borrower-obligor and the lender-obligee. See LITVINOFF,
OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 199, at 360; MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81,
No. 623 (citing French writers who have characterized the payment of a thing not due
as a particular quasi-contract pro mutuum); see also WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, THE
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 107 (1931, reprinted 1994). Other
scholars have understood unjustified enrichment as an abnormal negotiorum gestio.
See 31 CHARLES DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLEON, No. 49 (2d ed. 1882).
The French jurisprudence initially followed this approach, but it was quickly
dismissed by French doctrine. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] req., July 16, 1890, D. 1891, 1, 49, note M. Planiol, S. 1894, 1, 19
(Fr.); FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 35. On the quasi-contractual
nature of negotiorum gestio, see Coastal Env’t Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Intern.,
Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 20 (La. Ct. App. 2001); City of Shreveport v. Caddo Parish, 658
So. 2d 786, 795–96 (La. Ct. App. 1995). On the differences between negotiorum
gestio and enrichment without cause, see JOHN DENSON SMITH, LOUISIANA AND
COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 417–18 (4th ed. 1973).
169. Canal/Claiborne, LTD v. Stonehedge Dev., L.L.C., 156 So. 3d 627, 633–
34 (La. 2014) (“That a claim of enrichment without cause under La. Civ. Code
art. 2298 is a quasi-contractual claim is well-settled in our jurisprudence.”); Arc
Indus., L.L.C.. v. Nungesser, 970 So. 2d 690, 694–95 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that a quasi-contractual claim of enrichment without cause is sufficient to support
the application of LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 76.1 on venue); Our Lady of the Lake
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Helms, 754 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
170. See SMITH, supra note 168, at 417–19 (discussing the introduction of the
notion of quasi-contract and enrichment without cause in French and Louisiana law).
171. The Mazeaud brothers concur with Josserand in saying that quasi-contract is
a “legendary monster that should be banished from the juridical vocabulary.”
JOSSERAND, supra note 167, No. 10; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 167, No. 649.
Mousourakis prefers a more subtle renunciation of this term, calling it
“unsatisfactory.” GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
239 (2012). Levasseur and Terré et al. also aptly note that the Latin term “quasi ex
contractu nasci videntur” refers not to a source of the obligation but to the effect of
such an obligation “as if a contract were formed.” See LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at
9–15; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1026. The Louisiana Legislature acted wisely
in removing this term from the civil code. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2292–2293 (1870,
repealed 1995). Interestingly, the term still remains in the revised French Civil Code.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1376 (1804) (Fr.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 1302 (rev. 2016) (Fr.).
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without inquiring into the subjective factor of the enriched obligor’s
behavior.172
A more accurate and systematic approach would be to characterize
enrichment without cause as a type of juridical fact.173 The distinction
between juridical acts and juridical facts as sources of obligations is well
known in civilian theory.174 A juridical fact is a conduct or event to which
the law attaches legal consequences regardless of whether those
consequences are in fact desired.175 The conduct of a person can be licit or
illicit.176 Capacity and fault of the obligor in a licit juridical fact are
irrelevant factors, whereas culpability and liability are usual factors in the
case of illicit juridical facts.177 “Quasi-contracts,” including negotiorum
172. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 471 (9th ed. 1976).
173. 3 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASE, TRAITE
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, SUPPLEMENT No. 113 (1926).
174. 1 RENE DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL No. 11 (1923);
2 GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & JULIEN BONNECASSE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, SUPPLEMENT Nos. 248–613 (1925); 1 JACQUES FLOUR,
JEAN-LUC AUBERT & ERIC SAVAUX, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS, L’ACTE
JURIDIQUE, No. 60 (16th ed. 2014); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 10–21. A more
detailed and technical theory of juridical acts prevails in Germany and Greece. See
LUDWIG ENNECCERUS & HANS CARL NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES
BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS § 145 (15th ed. 1960); Jochem Schmitt §§ 104–115 and
Christian Armbrüster §§ 116–124, in 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BÜRGELICHEN GESETZBUCH (Franz Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015); BALIS,
supra note 65, §§ 32–34; Marianos Karasis, Eisagogi sta Arthra 127–200
[Introduction to Articles 127–200], in 1B ASTIKOS KODIX, KAT’ ARTHRO
ERMINEIA, GENIKES ARCHES [CIVIL CODE COMMENTARY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES]
1-28 (Apostolos Georgiades & Michael Stathopoulos eds., 2d ed. 2016) (Greece).
175. CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 449. It is noteworthy that the recent 2016
revision of the French Civil Code includes definitions of juridical acts and facts in two
new Articles: CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-1 (2018) (Fr.) (defining
actes juridiques as “exercises of will that are intended to produce legal effects”) and
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 (2018) (Fr.) (defining faits juridiques
as “conduct or events to which the law attaches legal consequences”). These articles
were added in defiance of the stern injunction by Portalis, original drafter of the Code
Napoléon, against the inclusion of doctrinal material in the code. See YIANNOPOULOS,
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 252; Gruning, supra note 7, at 63–64. The
German and Greek civil codes, although more verbose and heavily influenced by the
Pandectists, do not contain definitions of juridical acts and facts.
176. CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 449.
177. Aline Tenenbaum et al., Juridical Acts, Juridical Facts, in EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 72–76 (Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds.,
2008); cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1100-2 para. 2 (2018) (Fr.)
(“Obligations arising from a juridical fact are governed, as the case may be, by
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gestio, payment of a thing not due, and enrichment without cause, are licit
juridical facts.178
This classification seems to accommodate the co-existence of
objective and subjective factors in an obligation from enrichment without
cause. Although the obligor is strictly liable merely from the occurrence
of an unjustified appropriation of wealth, her good or bad faith is taken
into account when addressing issues of compensation.179 Further, the
obligee is charged with a duty of good faith, the breach of which may
impair the causal link between enrichment and impoverishment.180 As a
juridical fact, enrichment without cause generates a legal obligation of
restitution.
3. Enrichment Without Cause as Restitution, Not Restoration
Enrichment without cause binds the enriched obligor to make
restitution for the unjustified enrichment she received, which corresponds
to an impoverishment of the obligee. This observation necessarily means
that the object of the enrichment has exited the obligee’s patrimony and is
now part of the obligor’s patrimony.181 If, however, there is no lawful
cause for retaining this enrichment, the law holds the enriched party
accountable for returning that same benefit or its traceable product to the
impoverished obligee.182
This particular consequence of restitution ought to be distinguished
from restoration of a thing or benefit already belonging to the “obligee.”183
When a benefit or a particular thing is merely withheld by another, it is
the sub-chapter relating to extra-contractual liability or the sub-chapter relating to
other sources of obligations.”).
178. Tenenbaum et al., supra note 177, at 73; CARBONNIER, supra note 172,
at 449, 451; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, supra note 97, § 1.6; Arc
Indust., L.L.C. v. Nungesser, 970 So. 2d 690, 694 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Litvinoff’s definition of quasi contracts as “willful and lawful acts [that] give rise
to obligations without the concurrence of wills, that is, without the agreement of
the persons involved that is necessary for the formation of a contract”).
179. TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, Nos. 1069–71.
180. See Georges Bonet, La condition d’absence d’intérêt personnel et de faute
chez l’appauvri pour le succès de l’action de in rem verso, in MELANGES PIERRE
HEBRAUD 59 (Université Toulouse ed., 1981).
181. Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 607–08; ROBY, supra note 19, at 77 (“If
ownership had not passed, condiction was not applicable.” (citing DIG. 12.1.14)).
182. 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 938A.
183. See WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW 33–37 (1911,
reprinted 1983) (discussing restoration in cases of relative nullity on the basis of
the Roman restitutio in integrum).
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still owned by the “obligee” in question, who can reclaim it from the
“obligor” by bringing a real action.184 This is particularly the case with
nullity of a juridical act185 and dissolution of a contract.186 The purpose of
restoration is a reversal of the failed act.187
This general principle finds application particularly in the consequences
of the action of enrichment without cause,188 but it also complements the
previous two principles. Under the guidance of these general principles, and
with reference to comparative civilian jurisprudence and doctrine, focus is
now placed on the greatest mystery of enrichment without cause—its
requirements.
B. Requirements for an Action of Enrichment Without Cause
The jurisprudence identifies five requirements for enrichment without
cause: (1) enrichment of the obligor; (2) impoverishment of the obligee;
184. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 526 (2018). See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY,
supra note 18, §§ 11:7, 13:7. This distinction is long accepted in civil law and is
not unknown at common law where the potential misunderstanding of the term
“restitution” has been noticed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmts. a, c, e (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
185. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033. If a contract of sale is rescinded after the
thing sold has been delivered to the putative buyer and the price has been paid by
the putative buyer, ownership of the thing sold reverts back to the putative seller
while the buyer’s ownership of the funds is reinstated. Id. The same result is
reached in cases of dissolution of a sale. Id. art. 2018. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT &
GRUNING, supra note 99, §§ 15:9, 15:16.
186. When a contract is dissolved, the primary effect is that of restoration—the
parties are restored to their preexisting patrimonial situations, such restoration being
made in kind or by value. Art. 2018 para. 1. Nevertheless, if partial performance of
a value has been rendered to the party seeking performance and that party keeps that
performance, compensation is due to the other party for this enrichment. Id. para. 2
& cmt. d. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 99, § 15:3 n.15;
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, supra note 163, § 271.
187. Restoration of a payment of a thing not due (condictio indebiti)
historically served the same purpose. See CARBONNIER, supra note 172, at 463–
64. This concept appears in the pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code,
pursuant to which the payee must restore what she has received. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. arts. 2299, 2304; see also YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18,
§ 13:13 (explaining that the quasi-contractual action of a payment of a thing not
due is intended for restoration purposes).
188. This Article does not discuss the consequences of the action for
enrichment without cause. For discussion of the consequences, see generally
LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 429–37; Gordley, supra note 150, at 227–42;
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 433–44.
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(3) causal link between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) lack of
cause for the enrichment; and (5) unavailability of another remedy at law.189
French legal doctrine has grouped these requirements into material
requirements—enrichment, impoverishment, and causal link190—and
juridical requirements—lack of cause and inexistence of other remedy.191
The following discussion will focus on this categorization.192
1. Material Requirements
There are three material requirements for an action of enrichment without
cause: (1) enrichment of the obligor; (2) impoverishment of the obligee; and
(3) a causal link between the enrichment and the impoverishment. These
requirements are discussed with reference to French and Louisiana doctrine
and jurisprudence and to compatible German and Greek ideas.
a. Enrichment
Enrichment of the obligor occurs when “his patrimonial assets
increase or his liability diminishes.”193 The concept of enrichment is broad,
encompassing any advantage appreciable in money and taking diverse
forms.194 It can manifest itself as a positive gain, such as the acquisition of
189. See supra note 3; see also SMITH, supra note 168, at 418–19.
190. See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié, Conditions juridiques,
JurisClasseur Civil, Art. 1303 à 1304-4, Fascicule 10, June 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017).
191. See Valerio Forti, Enrichissement injustifié, Effets, JurisClasseur Civil,
Art. 1303 à 1304-4, Fascicule 20, June 2, 2016 (Dec. 10, 2017).
192. The usefulness of this classification lies in the burden of proof. Material
conditions are positive, whereas juridical conditions are negative. Although the
plaintiff must prove each of the five requirements, the defendant usually will base
her defense on the lack of a juridical requirement and bears the burden of
establishing peremptory exceptions against the action. Indust. Cos., Inc. v.
Durbin, 837 So. 2d 1207, 1213–16 (La. 2003); Fagot v. Parsons, 958 So. 2d 750,
752–53 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (both discussing the requirements for the success of
a peremptory exception of no cause of action against an action for enrichment
without cause). The plaintiff also shoulders the burden of proving the lack of a
cause for the enrichment because the existence of the cause is presumed. See
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 485.
193. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 cmt. b (2018).
194. The advantage received by the enriched obligor can be pecuniary or moral
or both. George Challies provides the example of attending a concert without
paying for admission as an example of an enrichment that “would be intellectual
and aesthetic rather than material.” See GEORGE CHALLIES, THE DOCTRINE OF
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 71–72 (2d ed. 1952); see
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property, an expense avoided, or the extinction of an obligation.195 Not all
enrichments, however, are actionable.196
Because French doctrine has not provided a satisfactory taxonomy of
the possible types of enrichment,197 it may be useful to refer here to the
German classification of enrichment, as simplified by Greek scholars, who
acknowledge three basic types of enrichment that, in some cases, may
overlap: (1) performance or other benefit conferred on the obligor at the
expense of the obligee; (2) obligor’s interference with the obligee’s
patrimony; and (3) expenses incurred by the obligee on the property of the
obligor.198
i. Performance or Benefit Conferred on Obligor at Obligee’s
Expense
Performance or other benefit conferred on the obligor at the expense
of the obligee can be direct or indirect. It is direct when the benefit passes
from the obligee’s patrimony directly to the obligor’s patrimony. 199 It is
indirect when the patrimony of a third person is involved.200 This category
of enrichment applies frequently in Germany and Greece because it

also Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 642–43. This example, however, also seems to
include a pecuniary advantage—not paying for admission. Perhaps attending
uninvited a private concert to which only certain attendees are invited by private
and gratuitous invitation would be a more accurate example of an enrichment that
is moral only. Be that as it may, the weight of authority in France and Quebec
accept that a “profit moral” can be claimed by means of an actio de in rem verso.
CHALLIES, supra, at 71–72; 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 753; 3
RENÉ DEMOGUE, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS No. 150 (1923); JOSSERAND, supra
note 167, No. 569.
195. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 39; MALAURIE ET AL.,
supra note 90, No. 1063 ; Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 641.
196. Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 101 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“Not
every unjust enrichment warrants usage of equity.” (citing Edmonston v. ASecond Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 1974)); see also FLOUR ET AL., FAIT
JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 33.; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1062.;
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 482.
197. Forti admits that the French term “enrichissement” is too broad and defies
systematic categorization. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 15, 17.
198. MICHAEL STATHOPOULOS, GENIKO ENOCHIKO DIKAIO [GENERAL LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS] 869 (4th ed. 2004) (Greece) [hereinafter STATHOPOULOS,
OBLIGATIONS]; 2 PANAGIOTIS ZEPOS, ENOCHIKON DIKAION. EIDIKON MEROS
[LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. SPECIAL PART] 686, 690–91 (2d ed. 1965) (Greece).
199. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40; see also infra note 249.
200. See Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40; see also infra note 249.
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typically refers to restoration on the basis of the Roman condictiones and
not restitution through the actio de in rem verso.201 As noted, in France and
in Louisiana, recovery of performances from a failed contract is achieved
by application of the theory of cause202 and the doctrines of nullity or
dissolution,203 as the case may be.204 This category of enrichment also finds
application in the restoration of the payment of a thing not due.205
201. This category typically forms the basis for a condictio causa data causa
non secuta, that is, a claim for the recovery of performances rendered under a
failed contract or third-party beneficiary arrangement involving the obligor and
obligee. See STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 198, at 907.
202. There are cases, however, that lie beyond the realm of cause. An example
would be a failure of cause occurring after the discharge of all conventional
obligations under the contract. Because the contract is no longer executory, belated
failure of cause is inoperative. In such a case, restoration is clearly excluded and
restitution seems to be the only remedy for any inequities. A celebrated example in
the French jurisprudence is that of an insurer who was entitled to bring the actio de
in rem verso against the insured in a policy of theft insurance, when the insurer paid
the coverage and the thing stolen was later recovered by the insured. Cour d’appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon, 1e ch., Mar. 18, 1981, JurisData 40817 (Fr.).
This situation closely resembles the example of the condictio sine causa in DIG.
12.7.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32) (concerning the unjustified enrichment of the owner
of lost clothes who was previously indemnified for the loss by a cleaner under a
laundry contract, and the clothes were later found).
203. There can be cases that lie beyond the scope of breach of contract. An
example would be the case of underpayment of an insured who was not paid the full
sum of interest due from the insurer. Payment was ordered on the basis of the actio de
in rem verso. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
1e civ., Dec. 10, 1980, JCP 1981, II, 11678, obs. L. Mourgeon (Fr.). Likewise, a
company not paying full compensation to an employee of a company is unjustifiably
enriched at the expense of said employee. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Reims, soc., Nov. 9, 1981, JurisData 42488 (Fr.).
204. See Forti, supra note 190, No. 31.
205. There may be cases, however, that lie within the “gray area” between
condictio indebiti and actio de in rem verso. This ambiguity is particularly true in cases
of overpayment for a performance received. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, 25th ch., Mar. 29, 1985, JurisData 22168 (Fr.) (finding unjustified
enrichment of a contractor who had received from the owner sums greater than what
was justified by the progress of the works). The dividing line is also blurred in cases
of mistaken payment of the debt of another. The payor (solvens) will have an action
for payment of a thing not due against the payee (accipiens). An action for enrichment
without cause would be subsidiary to the first action and must be brought against the
actual debtor who is enriched. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Apr. 4, 2001, D. 2001, 1824, note M. Billiau (Fr.) (ordering
the actual debtor to make restitution of insurance benefits paid by mistake). Cf. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2302 (2018).
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Nevertheless, there is room for the application of the French/Louisiana
model of enrichment without cause to this category of enrichments as well.
The remedy of restitution will apply when the contemplated performance
is extra-contractual, that is, a thing given or a benefit conferred outside the
realm of conventional obligations.206 An extra-contractual performance
can be direct or indirect.207
Instances of direct, extra-contractual performances typically involve
services rendered by the obligor directly to the obligee in the absence of a
contractual relationship. Two famous examples from the French
jurisprudence can be cited here: (1) the enrichment of the owner of a vehicle
that was repaired by the proprietor of a garage who believed in good faith that
a contract for the repairs existed;208 and (2) the enrichment of an heir who used
information advertised to him by a genealogist to establish his rights to a
succession of a distant relative without ever hiring the genealogist.209 In
Louisiana jurisprudence, claims for quantum meruit in the absence of an
agreement210 also fall under this category.211
206. See supra notes 181–188 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
281, 282, 294, 295 and accompanying text.
207. Cf. Forti, supra note 190, Nos. 38–40 (discussing the more general concept
of direct and indirect causal link between enrichment and impoverishment, which
also applies here); see also infra note 249.
208. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 8e ch., Mar. 19, 1976,
JurisData 242 (Fr.). Here, the fact that the garage proprietor acted in his own interest,
based on the erroneous belief of the existence of a contract, possibly excludes the
application of the provisions of negotiorum gestio. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2292 cmt. d. Compare with Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (characterizing the garage owner as a
depositary and allowing subrogation claim for the repairs against insurer).
209. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Poitiers, Dec. 2, 1907, D.
1908, 2, 332 (Fr.); see also Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 625. The French Cour de
cassation, however, later considered that this type of enrichment finds its cause in
the rules on devolution of the estate. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 28, 1991, JurisData 1466, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1992, p. 96, obs. J. Mestre (Fr.).
210. Reference is made here to the civilian concept of quantum meruit. Baker v.
Maclay Props. Co., 648 So. 2d 888, 896 (La. 1995) (finding that the civilian concept
of quantum meruit in the absence of an agreement “is more correctly referred to as
unjust enrichment, also known as actio de in rem verso”). Upon codification of the
actio de in rem verso, cases of quasi-contractual quantum meruit are now governed
by Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Jackson v. Capitol City Family
Health Ctr., 928 So. 2d 129, 132–33 (La. Ct. App. 2005). This terminology is
discussed infra note 303.
211. Quantum meruit can be contractual or quasi-contractual. Compare
Ricky’s Diesel Serv., Inc. v. Pinell, 906 So. 2d 536, 539 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
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Other examples of direct, extra-contractual performances concern
cases of voluntary work performed in the absence of any domestic or
cohabiting relationship.212 Yet other cases involve voluntary services
between spouses and family members, and courts confront the difficult
question of enrichment from gratuitous dispositions.213 In a number of
decisions, courts have sustained a claim of compensation made by a
spouse in a regime of separate property for payment of the spouse’s
separate debts or for assistance provided in the other spouse’s business or
profession.214 Compensation, however, was denied for services provided
by a spouse when the spouses were under a regime of acquets and gains,215
(applying quasi-contractual quantum meruit for repairs to a diesel engine without
a valid services contract), with Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place
2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 573 (La. 1989) (using contractual quantum meruit to
calculate remuneration of subcontractor when the existing agreement did not
address the issue and characterizing quantum meruit as a device for measurement
of damages rather than a method of recovery per se). See infra notes 294, 303.
212. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 15e ch., Mar.
10, 1978, JurisData 187 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of the heirs of a farm
owner for improvements made to the farm by plaintiff voluntary worker); Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 6, 1979, Gaz. Pal.
1979, 2, 237 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to voluntary employee of a company).
213. For an in depth discussion of this issue, see Nicolas Le Rudulier, La modernité
de l’enrichissement sans cause en droit de la famille, in MELANGES RAYMOND LE
GUIDEC 147 (V. Zalewski-Sicard et al. eds., 2014); Marlène Burgard, L’enrichissement
sans cause au sein du couple: quelles différences de régime entre époux, partenaires et
concubins?, LES PETITES AFFICHES [LPA], May 2010, No. 101, p. 35.
214. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 868 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding
compensation on the theory of unjustified enrichment to husband for payments he
made on wife’s separate debts with his separate funds). The same solution is
obtained when the claim is made following divorce proceedings. See Tribunal de
grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Apr. 6, 1968,
D. 1968 Somm. 101 (Fr.); see also Françoise Conneau, Inadéquation de
l’application de la théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause à l’indemnisation de
l’épouse séparée de biens, in MELANGES JEAN-PIERRE BEGUET 111 (Université de
Toulon ed., 1985); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e
civ., Dec. 16, 1997, JurisData 5376, DROIT & PATRIMOINE 1998, No. 1923, obs.
Chauvel (Fr.) (involving a mother who provided assistance to the operation of a
business belonging to her son and daughter-in-law).
215. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May
10, 1984, JurisData 871, DEFRÉNOIS 1985, art. 33560, p. 865, note G. Champenois
(Fr.). For discussion of the Louisiana law on this issue, see Kimberly D.
Higginbotham, Reimbursement for Satisfaction of Community Obligations with
Separate Property: Getting What’s Yours, 68 LA. L. REV. 181, 213 (2007)
(“[I]nstead of using the doctrine of enrichment without cause between spouses,
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as well as when the assistance provided did not exceed that imposed by
the spousal obligation of assistance.216 The jurisprudence has also admitted
claims of unjustified enrichment for assistance provided or expenses
incurred within concubinage,217 so long as a valid justification for
retention of the enrichment cannot be ascertained.218
courts employ article 2365 [of the Louisiana Civil Code], which provides the
alternative remedy of reimbursement for situations involving satisfaction of
community obligations with separate property.”); see also ANDREA CARROLL &
RICHARD MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 8:9, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (4th ed. 2016).
216. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 9,
1979, Bull. civ. I, No. 11, DEFRÉNOIS 1980, art. 32174, p. 44, note Posnard and art.
32348, p. 915, obs. J.-L. Aubert (Fr.). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (2018). It should
be remembered, however, that the general claim for unjustified enrichment among
spouses must yield before any other provisions of family law that will supply the rule
of decision as lex specialis. For instance, claims for contributions to education and
training are governed by a special provision. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 121.
217. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 14, 1987, D. 1987,
inf. rap. 36 (Fr.) (involving unjust enrichment of companion from loan repayments,
payment of notarial deeds, and building materials, relating to personal property and
made by concubine); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e
civ., Oct. 15, 1996, D. 1997, 177, note R. Libchaber, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1997, p. 636, obs. J. Hauser, and p. 657, obs. J. Mestre (Fr.)
(concubine providing assistance to her partner’s business and profession).
218. See Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295–96 (1871) (awarding
compensation to a concubine for her nursing services in the absence of proof that
concubinage was the motive for the parties’ cohabitation and that the services
rendered were incidental to such cohabitation). But see Moncrief v. Succession of
Armstrong, 939 So. 2d 714, 722 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (dismissing concubine’s
quantum meruit claim against decedent’s estate for services provided to
decedent). The Greek courts have gone a step further. The Greek Supreme Court
awarded compensation to a concubine for her substantial gifts to her late partner,
under the theory that the considerable value of these gifts signified an implied
promise to marry that was never fulfilled because of her partner’s death. See
Areios Pagos [AP] [Supreme Court] 1751/2014, Athens Bar Association Database
(Dec. 10, 2017), http://www.dsanet.gr (Greece) [https://perma.cc/QY2D-H4J2].
The court’s reasoning here is highly questionable. Although it is true that parties
can add a condition on their contract which shall furnish the causa, such a
condition—and any accompanying enrichment—cannot be unilaterally imposed
on the other party. See KASER, supra note 130, § 139.3, at 597. Cf. Succession of
Joublanc, 5 So. 2d 762, 764 (La. 1941) (“One who renders valuable services to
another on his promise that in his will he will compensate to the extent of the
value of the services the party rendering them is entitled to collect their value from
the succession of the party for whom the services were rendered if he dies without
having fulfilled his promise.”); Broussard v. Compton, 36 So. 3d 376, 377 (La.
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Direct extra-contractual performance can also occur in cases of a null
contract in which restoration based on the nullity of the contract is
insufficient or impracticable.219 Two illustrative examples from the French
jurisprudence involve the unjustified enrichment of the seller for
improvements made to the property by the purchaser following a purchase
agreement220 that was later annulled221 and the unjustified enrichment of a
retailer for work performed on his premises under a brewery contract that
subsequently was annulled.222
An extra-contractual performance can be indirect. Here, a third person
receives an advantage from an unpaid performance rendered on an original
contract. Usual examples from the jurisprudence involve a lessor
benefiting from improvements made to her property by a contractor hired
by the lessee who later defaulted on her obligations.223 The enrichment of
the owner of property at the expense of an unpaid subcontractor following

Ct. App. 2010) (plaintiffs made improvements on defendant’s land relying on
defendant’s oral promise to donate property to plaintiffs). LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 1967; David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel,
The Civil Law, and The Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 695,
720 (discussing the revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 1967 and the
introduction of detrimental reliance in the Louisiana civil law).
219. In Louisiana, it is questionable whether such a situation would be adequately
addressed by the “award of damages” contemplated in the first paragraph of Article
2033 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 para. 1 (“If it is
impossible or impracticable to make restoration in kind, it may be made through an
award of damages.”). An award of damages also is contemplated when the cause of
nullity is fraud or duress. Id. arts. 1958, 1964. When the cause of nullity is error, the
reliance interest of the innocent party may be protected either through an award of
damages or by upholding the contract. Id. art. 1952. See Saúl Litvinoff, Vices of
Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 39–45,
76–79, 101–03 (1989).
220. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2623.
221. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Reims, Nov. 2, 1981,
JurisData 42546 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of the seller of an
immovable for improvements made by the buyer in a purchase agreement that
was subsequently annulled due to the seller’s fraud).
222. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 23, 1980,
JurisData 1094 (Fr.).
223. The seminal Boudier case from France is an example. See supra note 3.
Several other examples from the French jurisprudence concern the enrichment of
an issuer of a check that was drawn on the wrong account. Cf. Cour d’appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 15e ch., May 6, 1983, JurisData 23439 (Fr.).
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default of the main contractor is another example.224 An action based on
indirect enrichment, however, often will stumble upon the usual existence
of a lawful cause that will excuse retention of the enrichment in the hands
of the third party, as discussed infra.225
The “performance” contemplated in this category is not limited only
to conventional obligations. Performance of a legal obligation having a
cause that has failed can also give rise to an action of enrichment without
cause.226 Again, enrichment here can be direct or indirect. The landmark
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Minyard227 furnishes an
example of indirect enrichment. The holding in this case seems to stand
for the proposition that an actio de in rem verso will lie in a contractual or
delictual “action in indemnity” against a third party whose fault triggered
the payment of damages in the absence of another remedy at law.228
ii. Obligor’s Interference with Obligee’s Patrimony
The second category of enrichments entails an obligor’s interference
with the obligee’s patrimony through unauthorized use of the latter’s
property or services. When such interference satisfies the requirements for

224. See, e.g., Vandervoort v. Levy, 396 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (involving
unjustified enrichment of owner of immovable property from additional work
performed by contractor who was instructed by architect to perform additional work).
225. The existence of a lawful cause, usually found in the legal relationship
between third-party enrichee and original obligor, also explains the complex
situations of third-party enrichments stemming from payment of a thing not due.
Thus, the situation in which obligor A is instructed by obligee B to pay C who is
B’s obligee presents many variations, all dependent on the validity of the obligation
between B and C. For a detailed discussion, see Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 609–
10. Existence of a lawful cause for retention of the enrichment also explains the nonavailability of a claim for unjustified enrichment against a third person who in good
faith and for value obtained the object of the enrichment from the obligor. Cf. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2305 cmt. d. For a detailed discussion of third party
enrichments, see Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 626–33.
226. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
1e civ., Feb. 1, 1984, JurisData 89 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to first husband
who successfully disavowed paternity against the second husband of the mother
for past child support payments). But see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Douai, Nov. 8, 1978, JurisData 2296 (Fr.) (refusing to extend such
compensation to past child support payments).
227. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
228. See Litvinoff, Appellate Courts, supra note 113, at 203–05.
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delictual liability, the action against the obligor will sound in tort.229 Here,
a non-delictual interference is contemplated,230 usually because the
requirements for delictual liability have not been met.231 Thus, the
unauthorized use of one’s image232 may be actionable as enrichment
without cause. Enrichment without cause can also result from the
exploitation of the intellectual property of others, such as the publication
of an operetta without authorization from the composer’s heirs,233 or the
229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315. Similarly, when the interference is
beneficial to the owner and satisfies the requirements of negotiorum gestio, this
quasi-contractual remedy ought to apply as lex specialis. See, e.g., Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., Jan. 15, 1866, D.P. 66,
1, 75, S. 66, 1, 52 (Fr.) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for restitution of expenses
incurred when plaintiff put out a fire on defendant’s property). See DEMOGUE,
supra note 194, No. 149; 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 753; RIPERT
& BOULANGER, supra note 167, No. 1277; JOSSERAND, supra note 167, No. 569;
BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 60, No. 1751; MARTY &
RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 350 n.7 and No. 382.
230. See Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 14.
231. German and Greek scholars usually refer to the example of a stowaway using
a means of transportation without paying a fare. According to their analysis, recovery
in delict or quasi-delict is unsatisfactory because the only “damage” caused would be
the unauthorized use or enjoyment of any complimentary onboard services and the
additional fuel consumed, if it can be calculated, but not the value of the fare, since
the stowaway occupied an empty seat. See STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note
198, at 881. Especially in the German “air-travel case,” delictual liability may be
excluded when the alleged tortfeasor is not culpable because of age or mental capacity.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2318–19.
Louisiana tort law seems more amenable to full recovery in such cases, based on the
Louisiana law concept of the tort of conversion. See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS
C. GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 2-6(i) (1996, Supp. 2003); WILLIAM
CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 12:13, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2009);
see also Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Inv., 721 So. 2d 853 (La. 1998) (enunciating
“principles of civilian conversion,” which can be exercised through one of the
following actions: (a) by means of a revendicatory action under LA. CIV. CODE art.
526; (b) by an action for restitution based on payment of a thing not due under LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2299; or (c) by a delictual action for damages under LA. CIV. CODE art.
2315). It is only when the requirements for these actions are not met that an actio de
in rem verso may become available. Based on the above, if the boy in the “air-travel
case,” discussed supra notes 141–151, had mistakenly boarded the wrong airplane and
this mistake was not actionable under Louisiana Civil Code article 2316, then an
action for enrichment without cause likely would be available.
232. See Patrick N. Broyles, Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity
in the Louisiana Civil Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 823 (2005).
233. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., July
6, 1927, S. 1928, 1, 19 (Fr.).
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unauthorized use of an invention, even if it was not patented by the inventor
or his successors.234
The unauthorized enjoyment or temporary use of an asset or a right235
belonging to another may also constitute enrichment. Thus, the original
purchaser of equipment who continued using the equipment upon
dissolution of the sale was held liable to compensate the original seller for
this unjustified enrichment.236 Unauthorized use may occur when a legal
cause for using the property of another has lapsed by operation of law.237
iii. Obligee’s Expenses on Obligor’s Property
The third category of cases includes expenses avoided on the part of
the obligor or improvements to the obligor’s property as a result of work
performed by the obligee. This category is residual in character and it
usually comprises cases in which the liability of the enriched party

234. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 8, 1963, ANNALES DE
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE [ANN. PROP. IND.] 1964, art. 1245, note Mathély (Fr.).
235. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 23e ch., Jan. 21,
1983, JurisData 20908 (Fr.) (concerning the lease of a billboard without the consent
of the real owner). The same result obtains in the example of a creditor seizing
property not belonging to his debtor or his debtor’s surety. Cour d’appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch, Feb. 28, 1983, JurisData 21462 (Fr.).
236. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Dec. 14,
1965, Bull. civ. III, No. 645 (Fr.). Because the continued use of the contractual object
occurred after the dissolution, this situation is best addressed by the provisions on
enrichment without cause. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298. On the other hand, if the
use occurred before the dissolution, an award of damages according to the more
specific rules on dissolution is the appropriate remedy. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2018. Absent such a specific provision in the French Civil Code, the French courts
resort to the actio de in rem verso in such cases. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, June 15, 1983, JurisData 24607 (Fr.) (involving the use of property by
purchaser prior to dissolution of purchase agreement). On the contrary, circumstances
may reveal that the plaintiff did not intend to make any profit from the transaction at
issue. In such a case, the gratuitous nature of the disposition furnishes justification for
the enrichment. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
comm., Mar. 4, 1974, JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL ARTICLES 1370 À 1381, fascicule 8/1988,
No. 153 (1988) (Fr.) (concerning a machine which had been lent by the plaintiff on
the basis of what seemed to have been a situation resembling a gratuitous loan for
use). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2891.
237. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Dec. 15, 1976, Bull. civ. I, No. 409 (Fr.) (divorced spouse was ordered to pay rent
to her former spouse for use of his apartment that she had occupied with her two
children from the date of final judgment of divorce).
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diminishes.238 The usefulness of this category is twofold. First, this category
highlights situations involving an enrichment that cannot be easily
characterized as a “performance” or “interference.” Examples include
extinguishing an obligation of the obligor to a third party, either by paying
off an obligor’s debt to a third party239 or performing an obligation
incumbent upon the obligor,240 or receiving an enrichment without
payment.241 Second, because this subcategory focuses on the obligee’s acts,
a closer examination of the obligee’s duty of good faith is warranted.242
Especially in cases of improvements to land by adverse possessors, the rules
on accession will apply nevertheless as lex specialis.243
238. This category will usually overlap with the preceding two categories.
Indeed, a situation involving improvements made to leased property by an unpaid
contractor hired by the lessee potentially fits under both categories. It could be
used as an example of an indirect extra-contractual performance rendered by the
contractor. It can also serve as an illustration of an expense avoided on the part of
the lessor who decides to keep the improvement. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Paris, 23e chapter, Dec. 12, 1978, JurisData 592 (Fr.)
(considering both options and choosing to characterize the enrichment as a cost
avoided by the lessor). Further, unauthorized use of an asset belonging to another
may also be seen as avoiding the expense of paying for the asset.
239. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ.,
June 4, 1924, D. 1926, 1, 102 (Fr.). Such cases, however, may overlap with
situations involving payment of a thing not due. See supra note 205.
240. See Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Lille, July 2, 1957, JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL ARTICLES 1370 À 1381,
fascicule 8/1988, No. 84 (1988) (Fr.) (demanding the child’s estranged father
compensate the non-custodian grandfather, who cared for the child of his
deceased daughter, to the extent exceeding the grandfather’s natural obligation to
care for the child). See infra note 305.
241. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris 15e ch., Oct.
8, 1981, JurisData 27696 (Fr.) (involving unjustified enrichment of a company
receiving services that were paid in error by another company).
242. As discussed infra notes 255–263 and accompanying text, the obligee
will not be able to claim compensation when she acted in her own interest and at
her own risk and peril. See FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 50–
51; STATHOPOULOS, OBLIGATIONS, supra note 198, at 875–76.
243. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 11.22; Symeon
Symeonides, Developments in the Law: 1983-84, Property, 45 LA. L. REV. 541, 542–
43 (1984) (noting that the gaps in the pre-1984 law of accession “could be filled only
by analogical interpretation of [several Civil Code] articles . . . resorting to the general
principle of unjust enrichment.”). See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 3e civ., Jan. 26, 1972, Bull civ. III, No. 65 (Fr.) (applying the rules
on accession for improvements to land by a construction company that was later
declared insolvent). For a detailed discussion of the concept of good faith with relation
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b. Impoverishment
Impoverishment of the obligee occurs when “his patrimonial assets
diminish or his liabilities increase.”244 In this sense, impoverishment is the
negative aspect of enrichment. Cases of impoverishment without a cause,
therefore, should not differ from cases of enrichment without cause.245 The
plaintiff must establish that the transfer of value was made at the expense
of her patrimony, and this claim must be appreciable in money.246
c. Causal Link Between Enrichment and Impoverishment
According to the prevailing opinion in civilian doctrine, the term causal
link is described as a correlation between enrichment and impoverishment,
which must be the incontestable result of the same event.247 In most cases,248

to adverse possessors, see John A. Lovett, Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law, 78
LA. L. REV. 1163 (2018).
244. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 cmt. b (2018); Nicholas I, supra note 11,
at 643–44.
245. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra note 167, No. 1278 (“What shocks
equity is not that a person is enriched, which is indeed permissible; it is that it be
at the expense of others.”).
246. In essence, the plaintiff also must establish that she received no counterperformance or compensation for her impoverishment. See Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ, May 6, 2009, JurisData 48116
(Fr.) (holding that the “impoverishment” of a companion who built a house on his
concubine’s land is not established if it was offset by his occupation of the house
without charge for a number of years); see also RÉMY CABRILLAC, DROIT DES
OBLIGATIONS No. 206 (11th ed. 2014) (discussing this issue as a lack of
justification of the obligor’s enrichment).
247. See Georges Bonet, Enrichissement sans cause, in JURISCLASSEUR CIVIL
ARTICLES 1370 A 1381, fascicule 8/1988, No. 115 (1988); FLOUR ET AL., FAIT
JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 41; BENABENT, supra note 110, No. 489; PHILIPPE
MALINVAUD ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 812 (13th ed. 2014); BERTRAND
FAGES, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS No. 452 (5th ed. 2015).
248. There have been cases in which such correlation was absent
automatically, that is, without any act or fault of the parties. For example, an
original plaintiff in civil proceedings and her attorney could not claim unjustified
enrichment of subsequent plaintiffs who relied on that attorney’s work on the case,
absent any indication of additional work performed. St. Pierre v. Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 102 So. 3d 1003, 1014–15 (La. Ct. App. 2012);
Lyons v. City of Shreveport, 339 So. 2d 466, 499 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Kirkpatrick
v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622, 624 (La. 1984); see also Baron v. Baron, 286 So. 2d
480 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that an attorney appointed by certain heirs to

2018]

DEMYSTIFYING ENRICHMENT WITHOUT CAUSE

1267

establishing such a correlation will be a relatively straightforward
exercise.249
On the other hand, an established causal link between enrichment and
impoverishment can be severed by acts of the obligee. It is a rigorous
principle of the law of obligations that the obligee to a claim for damages
is held to a duty of good faith.250 Thus, in cases of contractual or delictual
liability, the doctrine of comparative fault,251 or the obligee’s failure to
abide by reasonable mitigating duties,252 will reduce the amount of
damages sought from the breaching obligor. This reduction occurs because
the obligee’s acts or omissions severed or impaired the causal link between
the obligor’s liability and the direct damage sustained by the obligee. The
same principle ought to apply to cases of liability for enrichment without
cause. Although the obligor is strictly liable for her enrichment that
correlates with the obligee’s impoverishment, the obligee’s breach of the
duty of good faith may impair this causal link.253
recover assets of the succession to the benefit of all the heirs was entitled to seek
payment only from the persons who employed him).
249. The correlation can be direct or indirect, that is, through the patrimony of
a third person. Also, it does not matter that impoverishment has not been the only
condition for enrichment, as long as there is a correlation between the two. See 7
PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 167, No. 755 n.2 (noting the lack of such a link in
the example of a contractor who may not claim unjustified enrichment when his
impoverishment resulted mainly from his own mismanagement or misfortune).
250. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, §§ 5.32–5.33, 10.6.
251. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2003, 2323 (2018).
252. See LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, §§ 5.32–5.33, 10.6; see also
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2002.
253. Examining the obligee’s duty of good faith in the context of the causal
link between enrichment and impoverishment is preferred by this author as a
simpler and more straightforward approach. French doctrine, on the other hand,
discusses the obligee’s duty of good faith when examining the juridical
requirement of lack of cause or justification for the enrichment. According to this
view, the obligee’s failure to abide by her duty of good faith serves as a cause for
the justification of the obligor’s enrichment. To justify this approach, several
authorities identify two elements in the juridical requirements of unjustified
enrichment, namely, a “technical” and a “moral” element. The technical element
refers to the traditional requirements of lack of cause and subsidiarity of the
remedy for unjustified enrichment. The moral element focuses on the behavior of
both the obligor and obligee and sanctions their bad faith. See TERRÉ ET AL., supra
note 90, Nos. 1068–71; P. Rémy, Des autres sources d’obligations, in POUR UNE
REFORME DU REGIME GENERAL DES OBLIGATIONS 44, 45 (F. Terré ed., 2013). The
addition of this moral element prevailed in the revision of the French Civil Code
and has been criticized for abruptly departing from the past understanding of
cause. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1303-2 (2018) (Fr.) (reducing

1268

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The obligee clearly breaches her duty of good faith254 when the
impoverishing act was performed by the obligee in pursuit of her own
personal interest and at her own risk or by her own wrongful act.255 Such
is the case when a contractor agrees to rebuild a school while fully aware
of the risks associated with the collection of his fee and the legality of the
contract.256 Similarly, a business consultant cannot claim compensation for
his impoverishment that was a result of a failed business deal. 257
Voluntary improvements made to the property of another with
knowledge of a lack of any juridical cause will negate any action for
unjustified enrichment.258 The French jurisprudence refers to several other
examples of improvements made by bad faith possessors,259 although, in
the recovery of an obligee who pursues a personal interest or who is in bad faith)
and CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1303-4 (2018) (Fr.) (increasing the
amount of compensation owed by a bad faith obligor).
254. With reference to the juridical requirement of lack of cause, French writers
distinguish cause of the enrichment from cause of the impoverishment and discuss
the fault of the obligee in relation to cause of the impoverishment. See STARCK,
supra note 30, Nos. 1818–19. For a discussion of this requirement with reference to
the Louisiana jurisprudence, see LEVASSEUR, supra note 3, at 399–403.
255. Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming trial
court’s finding “that any impoverishment claimed by plaintiff was a result of his
attempts ‘for his own gain’ and that his presence and actions on the property of a
third party placed him in a ‘precarious position, if not in legal bad faith.’”);
BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 60, No. 1752; Bonet, supra
note 180, at 59–64.
256. Bamburg Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Lawrence Gen. Corp., 817 So. 2d 427,
438 (La. Ct. App. 2002). French jurisprudence steadily dismisses claims of
unjustified enrichment brought by contractors who were compelled to perform
additional work when the need for this work is attributed to the contractor’s own
fault. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ.,
Jan. 13, 1982, JurisData 112 (Fr.).
257. Zeising v. Shelton, 648 Fed. App’x 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2016).
258. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Mar.
18, 1954, JCP 1954 II 8168, note P. Ourliac and M. de Juglart. (Fr.) (denying
unjustified enrichment claim of evicted farmer who continued cultivating land
knowing that he was no longer a lawful possessor).
259. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ.,
June 7, 1974, Bull. civ. III, No. 240 (Fr.) (dismissing unjustified enrichment claim
of an adverse possessor who had built a hotel on the property of the owner); see
also the following French Cours d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal]
decisions: CA Pau, Apr. 19, 1983, JurisData 42112 (dismissing unjustified
enrichment claim for improvements made by a companion to his concubine’s
dwelling in which he had stayed rent free for a considerable period of time); CA
Reims, Oct. 17, 1983, JurisData 44092 (dismissing an enrichment claim for
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Louisiana, such situations are governed by rules of property law as lex
specialis.260
An obligee acts in her own interest particularly when she imposes the
enrichment on the other party who normally would not incur such an
expense. Thus, the owner of a mill who incurred expenses for widening a
river cannot claim the unjustified enrichment of the owners of the mills
downstream who were also benefitted by this action.261
Lastly, when the enrichment consists of expenses avoided by the obligor
because of acts of the obligee, the obligee’s actions should be carefully
scrutinized to determine whether the obligee abided by her duty of good
faith.262 Thus, a homeowner who moved her home onto the property of

improvements to land made by a prospective purchaser when the final sale was
not concluded because of that purchaser’s fault); CA Pau, Apr. 30, 1986,
JurisData 41332 (dismissing an enrichment claim for improvements to a building
made by an occupant who had no semblance of title).
260. See YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 11.22; Symeonides,
supra note 243, at 542–43; Lovett, supra note 243. The rules on accession, however,
do not always exclude the admissibility of equitable remedies. See, e.g., Brankline
v. Capuano, 656 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the previous owner of
a building who lost ownership under Louisiana Civil Code article 493 could bring
an action for damages under a theory of quantum meruit); Broussard v. Compton,
36 So. 3d 376 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming trial court judgment ordering owner
to compensate adverse possessor for improvements made under a theory of
unjustified enrichment). A cause of action for improvements may also be
established in contract if an accession clause is found in a contract between the
parties. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (2018); Davis v. Elmer, 166 So. 3d 1082,
1088 (La. Ct. App. 2015). But see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
261. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 22,
1927, S. 1927, 1, 338; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 1e civ., Oct. 19, 1976, Bull. civ. I, No. 300 (Fr.) (dismissing unjustified
enrichment claim of landowner who extended the power grid to his own land by
facilitating the connection of his neighbor); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] 3e civ., May 20, 2009, JurisData 48239 (Fr.) (dismissing
unjustified enrichment claim of association of riparian landowners that performed
work to maintain the navigability of two rivers thereby benefitting neighboring
landowners).
262. See supra note 242 and infra note 342. Cf. Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 (La.
1855) (“The equitable doctrine, that one at whose expense another is benefited must be
indemnified, cannot be extended to a person who intrudes his services on another against
his will and the policy of a statute.”). Accord Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 6, 1953, D. 1953, 609, note Goré (Fr.).
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another and, upon being evicted, abandoned it, has no action for
enrichment without cause.263
2. Juridical Requirements
French and Louisiana jurisprudence developed the juridical
requirements to restrict the number of cases in which the remedy of the actio
de in rem verso would be available. Traditional doctrine identifies two such
requirements—lack of cause and unavailability of another remedy at law.
a. Lack of Cause for Retaining Enrichment
The existence of a lawful cause for enrichment excludes any claim for
restitution.264 The term “cause” in this context should be understood in its
broader sense, encompassing any legal justification265 for the retention of
the enrichment in the hands of the enrichee.266 The Louisiana Civil Code
explains that “[t]he term ‘without cause’ is used in this context to exclude

263. Rougeou v. Rougeou, 971 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 2007). In the same vein,
see MJH Operations, Inc. v. Manning, 63 So. 3d 296 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing
repair shop’s unjustified enrichment claim against vehicle owner for unpaid repairs
because plaintiff made no genuine effort to collect payment and failed to enforce any
other statutory remedy, such as the repairman’s privilege on automobiles); Meyers v.
Denton, 848 So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (dismissing landowners’ reimbursement
claim for improvements made to road because they knew or should have known that
the road was public); MKM, L.L.C. v. Revstock Marine Transp., Inc., 773 So. 2d 776
(La. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing reimbursement claim brought by sellers of vessel who
refurbished vessel after parties had signed purchase option agreement).
264. See Roubier, supra note 60, at 47.
265. The revised French Civil Code refers to “unjustified enrichment,”
enrichissement injustifié—thus preferring the term “justification” to “cause.” This
change is semantic and does not change the law. See Forti, supra note 92, No. 2.
266. Cf. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co. of Slidell, 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La.
1974) (“‘Cause’ is not in this instance assigned the meaning commonly associated
with contracts.”). Traditional French doctrine interpreted “cause” in this context to
mean the regular mode of acquisition of a right. See RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra
note 167, No. 1280. In this sense, cause is tantamount to the Roman iusta causa, that
is, the broad notion of cause which is defined as the reason why a person holds a right
(any right) in the civil law. See MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 353. The
existence of a legal cause is presumed. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
absence of a justification for retention of the enrichment. See JOSSERAND, supra note
167, No. 573; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., Nov.
21, 1917, S. 1920, 1, 293 (Fr.).
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cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the
law.”267 The following discussion is based on this classification.
i. Valid Juridical Act
A valid juridical act is a volitional justification for the retention of the
enrichment.268 Emphasis here is placed on the will of the impoverished
party who voluntarily places the enrichment in the hands of the enriched
party. Here, cause of the enrichment coincides with the cause of
conventional obligation.269 Also, the will of the impoverished party gives
effect to the alienation of her property and excludes belated complaints
under the guise of enrichment without cause by application of the civilian
maxim non venire contra factum proprium.270
The juridical act can be unilateral, such as a testament, or bilateral,
such as a contract.271 Contracts are the most significant causes for the
retention of the enrichment,272 especially when the contract is between the

267. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2018). See Gruning, supra note 7, at 65–
66 (arguing that the definition of “cause” in Louisiana Civil Code article 2298 is
didactic but still useful to avoid any misunderstandings in practice).
268. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 44; TERRÉ ET AL.,
supra note 90, No. 1068.
269. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1966–70.
270. “[N]o one is allowed to go against (the consequences) of one’s own act.”
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS I, supra note 17, § 88 n.32. See Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 17, 1944, S. 1944, 1, 132
(Fr.) (holding that the actio de in rem verso cannot enable a contracting party to
bring forward belated complaints of a bad bargain and noting that “it is not up to
the judge to modify a contract concluded between the parties, nor to deprive of
the seller the profit that has its legal cause in a lawful contract, entered into freely
by the parties.”); see also JCD Mktg. Co. v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 812 So.
2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the enrichment accruing to hotel from
renting rooms above standard rates allegedly promised to tour operator was not
unjust because hotel would be justified in seeking such rates). Therefore, the
impoverished party cannot invoke enrichment without cause in the presence of a
contract, even if it is lesionary for one of the parties. See RIPERT & BOULANGER,
supra note 167, No. 1280 (“The unfairness of enrichment exists only if the
defendant had no right to retain it, and there can be no question here of an abuse
of the right because it is a perfectly defined right.”).
271. BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491.
272. Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver, L.L.C. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.,
376 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Louisiana law provides that no unjust
enrichment claim shall lie when the claim is based on a relationship that is controlled
by an enforceable contract.”) (emphasis added); see Edwards v. Conforto, 636 So.
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enriched and impoverished parties.273 A contract can be solemn or
consensual;274 onerous, such as a contract of sale,275 lease,276 insurance,277
partnership278 or distribution agreement;279 or gratuitous, such as a
donation280 or mandate.281
A contract also may serve as a cause for the retention of the
enrichment, even if it is concluded between the enriched party and a third
person.282 A typical situation involves unpaid contractors hired by the
lessee to make improvements to leased property. If the lease contract
supplies a justification for the lessor’s retention of these improvements,
the contractor’s claim against the lessor must fail.283 Similar cases involve

2d 901, 907 (La. 1993) (“[I]f there is a contract between the parties it serves as a
legal cause, an explanation, for the enrichment.”) (emphasis added).
273. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jan.
18, 1994, JurisData 125 (Fr.).
274. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Nov. 5, 2009, Gaz. Pal. 2010, No. 6, p. 25, obs. D. Houtcieff and No. 141, p. 48,
obs. H. Lecuyer (Fr.).
275. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May
17, 1944, S. 1944, 1, 132 (Fr.).
276. Conn-Barr, L.L.C. v. Francis, 103 So. 3d 1208, 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that the sale of interest in a company constitutes legal justification for
retention of enrichment). Accord Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] civ., Mar. 28, 1939, S. 1939, 1, 265 (Fr.).
277. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct.
23, 2008, JurisData 45474 (Fr.).
278. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Oct.
4, 1976, Bull. civ. IV, No. 242 (Fr.).
279. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Oct.
23, 2012, JurisData Nos. 23935 and 23923; REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL
[RTDCIV] 2013, p. 114, obs. B. Fages (Fr.).
280. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Feb. 6, 2001, JurisData 8163 (Fr.).
281. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ.,
Mar. 16, 1977, Bull. civ. III, No. 130 (Fr.).
282. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortg. Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 1974). See
TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1068; BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491.
283. See supra note 258; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 3e civ., May 28, 1986, JCP 1986 IV 226 (Fr.) (holding that an
accession clause in lease contract excluded claim for restitution brought by unpaid
contractor who was hired by lessee to install a pool on the leased property); FLOUR ET
AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 47; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 90, No. 1068;
BÉNABENT, supra note 110, No. 491. But see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
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construction contracts,284 real estate sales,285 and mortgages.286
Nevertheless, a contract between the enriched party and a third person will
not furnish a valid justification if such contract is a product of collusion
between the parties.287
In all cases, however, a contract will justify retention of the
enrichment if such enrichment falls within the purview of the contract.288
If additional performance is rendered, which is outside the agreed scope
of the contract, enrichment of the recipient of such performance is not
justified by the contract.289 Similarly, performances rendered in the precontractual or post-contractual phase do not find justification in the
contract.290
284. See, e.g., Century Ready Mix Corp. v. Boyte, 968 So. 2d 893 (La. Ct.
App. 2007) (finding that a loan contract between a bank and a subcontractor
supplied justification for retention of the bank’s enrichment).
285. See, e.g., Giordano v. Riverbend Rentals Co., 674 So. 2d 444 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that payments due from sale of a house find their cause in the
valid contract of sale, irrespective of the fact that ownership of the house was
lost); see also Sheets Family Partners-La., Ltd. v. Inner City Refuge Econ. Dev.
Corp., 94 So. 3d 964, 972 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that monies paid by
prospective purchaser to mortgagee found their cause in a lease agreement
between the two and are not recoverable by the seller upon dissolution of the sale
upon theory of enrichment without cause).
286. See, e.g., Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648 (La. 1996) (finding that
mortgage contract furnishes justification for mortgagee’s enrichment from
collection of rentals and occupation of the mortgaged property).
287. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 26, 1899, S.
1901, 2, 167 (Fr.) (holding that an accession clause in a lease contract providing
that lessor would keep improvements is unopposable to a contractor making such
improvements if “there was collusion between the lessor and lessee to frustrate
the contractor’s payment of his fee”).
288. See FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 45.
289. Id.; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
May 24, 2005, JurisData 28528 (Fr.) (finding no justification for the enrichment
occurring when a mechanic performed more extensive repairs than those agreed
with the client).
290. See, e.g., Hertz Lease Plan, Inc. v. Urban Transp. & Planning Assoc., Inc.,
342 So. 2d 886 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding compensation to lessor for lessee’s
continued peaceable possession after termination of the lease); Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 13, 2004, JurisData 24673,
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 2005, p. 120, obs. J. Mestre et B.
Fages (Fr.) (finding no justification for use of a billboard sign by an advertising
company even though negotiations with the owner of the sign never resulted in
formation of a contract); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
3e civ., May 31, 2006, JurisData 33725 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to lessee for
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Nevertheless, French and Greek scholars291 have supported a more
expansive construction of the term “just cause” to include any type of
“counter-performance”292 given by a good faith enrichee for the
enrichment, even in the absence of a juridical act. According to this theory,
there is no enrichment for voluntary services provided in exchange for
some material benefit received for such services, even in the absence of a
contract.293 Likewise, enrichment from use of one’s property is justified if
“rent” was paid, even in the absence of a valid lease agreement.294

improvements to the leased property made after the judgment pronouncing the
termination of the lease).
291. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 102–
30; Rouast, supra note 163, 35–40
292. The term “counter-performance” here is used as a literal translation of the
French term contrepartie, denoting a counter-prestation or a value given in return
for the enrichment. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note
10, at 105 n.17, 108, 110 n.36.
293. Such material benefit need not be monetary or even corporeal. See Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 19, 1969, Bull. civ.
I, No. 187 (Fr.) (holding that the education received during an apprenticeship was a
fair counter-performance for the apprentice’s voluntary services); Tribunal de grande
instance [TFI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Cambrai, Feb. 2, 1967: D. 1967
Somm. 97 (Fr.) (voluntary worker on a farm received material benefit of free room
and board). Also, enrichment deriving from services or other material benefit provided
within concubinage can find justification in the common life of the couple. See
Lagarde v. Dabon, 98 So. 744 (La. 1923); Simpson v. Normand, 26 So. 266 (La.
1899); Purvis v. Purvis, 162 So. 239 (La. Ct. App. 1935); see also supra note 218.
294. This broader concept of “counter-performance for the enrichment”
adequately explains the complex situations involving third party enrichments. This
concept also provides a solid basis for the enforceability of implied in fact contracts
(de facto contracts, contrats réels). See Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal
Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 573 (La. 1989) (defining such a contract as “one which
rests upon consent implied from facts and circumstances showing mutual intention
to contract [and] not different in their legal effect from express, written
agreements”); see also Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 295 (1871) (“For
actions without words, either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of a
contract, where they are done under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to
such a contract.”). In essence, the justification of the enrichment is the legal cause
for such contracts. See STATHOPOULOS, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT, supra note 10,
at 103–04; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 23, at 22–24. Cf. Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] com., May 9, 1985, JurisData 1232 (Fr.)
(involving a de facto lease in which the lessee remained in the property after the
termination of the lease); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch.,
May 22, 1984, JurisData 23657 (Fr.) (concerning a de facto employment contract
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ii. The Law
When a specific legal rule justifies retention of the enrichment, “an
action must not be allowed to defeat the purpose of said rule.”295 Several
legal provisions directly furnish a title for retention of the enrichment on
the basis of the overarching principle of unjustified enrichment. This
category is broad and encompasses many situations that involve several
areas of the law, including the laws of property,296 family,297 and
successions.298 The most frequently occurring situations specific to the law
of obligations include failed juridical acts, natural obligations, “quasicontracts,” and judicial decisions.
ii-a. Failed Juridical Acts
When a juridical act fails, the usual remedy calls for restoration of the
parties to their pre-existing patrimonial positions by application of the
rules on nullity as lex specialis. Nevertheless, retention of a performance
in which the employee continued working despite the invalidity of the original
employment contract).
295. Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 702 So. 2d 648, 657 (La. 1996); Bd. of
Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72, 81 (La. Ct. App.
2008); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La.
Ct. App. 2001).
296. The laws of accession, for instance, regulate the ownership of
improvements made on the property of another and provide for compensation based
on considerations of unjustified enrichment. See supra note 243 and accompanying
text. But see also supra note 260.
297. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May
2, 1979, D. 1979, inf. rap. 432 (Fr.) & Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 7, 1995, JurisData 3824 (Fr.) (finding that marital
obligations of support and assistance between spouses provide justification for any
claimed enrichment). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (2018). See supra notes 215–
216 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 209. Other examples can be found in the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, such as LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4801 (2018) (Louisiana Private Works Act);
see J.P. Mack Indus., L.L.C. v. Mosaic Fertilizer, L.L.C., 970 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521
(E.D. La. 2013) (availability of remedy under Private Works Act precluded
subcontractor to recover under a theory of enrichment without cause); see also LA.
REV. STAT. § 12:1-622(C) (Louisiana Business Corporation Act) (imposing
personal liability on shareholders who receive corporate distributions in excess of
what may be authorized by law); GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 44:17, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed.
2017) (discussing shareholders’ liability for wrongful distributions under the “unjust
enrichment type of liability”).
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or benefit from the failed contract may still be justified by application of
the provisions on nullity or dissolution. If the contract is null, restoration
can be excluded under the clean hands doctrine.299 Thus, collection of
commission payments to a real estate broker on the basis of a commission
agreement that was void ab initio will not be restored if the payer knew or
should have known of the nullity.300 Likewise, claims for restoration and
restitution arising from a failed “agreement” between the proprietor of a
casino establishment and a patron concerning the exclusive use of a slot
machine that would “hit the jackpot soon” were not actionable.301 In this
context, however, null juridical acts should be kept separate from
inexistent acts. If an act is inexistent,302 that is, if a contract was never
formed, then the provisions on enrichment without cause could apply.303
299. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033 cmt. b. See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS II, supra
note 163, § 94 (discussing the clean hands doctrine in the context of the bona fide
purchase doctrine); Saúl Litvinoff, Contract, Delict, Morals, and Law, 45 LOY. L.
REV. 1, 6–8 (1999) (comparing theories of recovery under contract and tort). In the
case of dissolution of a contract, retention of a performance or recovery for a
performance will be permitted “[i]f partial performance has been rendered and that
performance is of value to the party seeking to dissolve the contract.” LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2018. See supra notes 186, 236. The doctrines of nullity and dissolution also
provide for the protection of innocent third parties whose interests are not impaired by
the effects of restoration. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2021, 2035.
300. Pique Severn Ave. P’ship v. Ballen, 773 So. 2d 179, 181 (La. Ct. App.
2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2033.
301. Master v. Red River Entm’t, L.L.C., 188 So. 3d 284, 285 (La. Ct. App.
2016). Also, there is no recovery on theory of unjustified enrichment if the implied
contract is illegal. See Jary v. Emmett, 234 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Fox v.
Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 (1855). If, however, the contract is void as being malum
prohibitum and not malum in se, recovery on the basis of enrichment without cause
is allowed. See Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914, 917–18 (La. Ct. App.
1974); Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974). The recovery in these
cases can also be based on the de facto contract theory discussed supra note 294.
302. On the difference between inexistent and absolutely null juridical acts,
see 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & BONNECASE, supra note 173, Nos. 11–26; 1
PLANIOL I, supra note 93, Nos. 345, 348; see also Scalise, Jr., supra note 103, at
696–97 (“[A] third and lesser-known subclass of these types of [absolute] nullities
exists. This final subclass . . . consists of acts that are null not because they violate
public policy but because they are permanently defective insofar as they are not
really juridical acts at all; they are inexistent acts.”).
303. This distinction becomes relevant in light of the discussion of quantum
meruit in Louisiana law. See generally LITVINOFF, DAMAGES, supra note 30, §
14.25; Nicholas II, supra note 91, at 56–62 (discussing the types of quantum
meruit in Louisiana law); Jeffrey Oakes, Article 2298, the Codification of the
Principle Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit
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ii-b. Natural Obligations
Natural obligations provide lawful justification for retaining the
enrichment.304 Judicial decisions are consistent with this approach.305
as a Basis for Recovery in Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 873, 880–85 (1995)
(discussing the history of quantum meruit in Louisiana law). As discussed in Cent.
Facilities Operating Co. v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 700, 707 (M.D.
La. 2014),
Louisiana law recognizes two types of quantum meruit: contractual
quantum meruit and quasi contractual quantum meruit. . . . To recover
on a contractual quantum meruit theory, an agreement must exist
between the parties. . . . To recover under a quasi-contractual quantum
meruit theory, the plaintiff must confer a benefit on the defendant
pursuant to a contract it believed to be valid but was actually void.
(emphasis added). Perhaps more accurately, if a contract is null, recovery of a
price will be governed by the provisions of nullity. Art. 2033. If a valid contract
is dissolved, recovery will be subject to special rules. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
2018–21. But if there never was a contract, that is, if a contract is inexistent,
restitution will be made pursuant to the rules of enrichment without cause. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298. Thus, a lack of the meeting of the minds between
customer and diesel engine repair company as to the price for repair works leads
to an inexistent contract. Recovery of a fair market price will be based on
enrichment without cause. Ricky’s Diesel Serv., Inc. v. Pinell, 906 So. 2d 536,
539 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Villars v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 122 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
see also Mark A. Gravel Prop., L.L.C v. Eddies BBQ, L.L.C., 139 So. 3d 653,
657–58 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (“[W]here there is no meeting of the minds between
the parties the contract is void for lack of consent.”) (emphasis added). But see
also Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 108 So. 414 (La. 1926) (characterizing a
lack of the meeting of the minds as a case of mutual error). Restoration because
of rescission of a contract, however, will be governed by the rules on nullity,
unless additional performances have been rendered after the rescission of the
contract. But see Semco, L.L.C. v. Grant, Ltd., 221 So. 3d 1004, 1030 (“If
rescission is granted, there is no enforceable contract and the equitable doctrine
of unjust enrichment may apply.” (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298)).
304. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1761; see also LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN
GENERAL, supra note 97, §§ 2.1, 2.7 (defining natural obligations and discussing their
effect on quasi-contracts); Smith, supra note 43, at 17–18 (discussing the usefulness
of natural obligations in the characterization of contracts within the theory of cause).
305. See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 835 So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing
nephew’s claim that his aunt was unjustly enriched by his unpaid services because
nephew’s natural obligation justified aunt’s enrichment); Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., June 25, 1872: D. 74, 1, 16, S.
73, 1, 129 (Fr.) (finding that grandmother’s maintenance and education expenses
for the benefit of her grandchild constituted a natural obligation that excluded her
unjustified enrichment claim); see also supra note 240.
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When a gratuity is prompted by beneficence of the grantor or by feelings
of affection or devotion toward the beneficiary, an action de in rem verso
cannot be brought against the beneficiary.306 Such a feeling obviously
hinders the enrichment action between the person who felt it and the
person who inspired it.307 Services provided among family members are
presumed gratuitous.308 The provision of gratuitous services will serve as
a cause for the retention of the enrichment in the hands of the recipient of
such services, even in cases in which the provision of these services was
prompted by an ulterior motive that was not realized.309
A prescribed action also gives rise to a natural obligation,310 thus
justifying retention of enrichment. This justification, in turn, explains why

306. This rule has been accepted since the early jurisprudence. See New
Orleans, Ft. J. & G.I.R. Co. v. Turcan, 15 So. 187, 189 (La. 1894); Watson v.
Ledoux, 8 La. Ann. 68, 68 (1853) (holding that “services rendered voluntarily to
preserve another man’s property from destruction [by flood] are presumed to be
gratuitous, and give no cause of action”). But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292;
see also Tilghman v. Lewis’s Estate, 8 La. 105 (1835); Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2
Mart. (O.S.) 269 (1812); Ayland v. Rice, 23 La. Ann. 75 (1871); White v. Jones,
14 La. Ann. 681 (1859) (all holding that no compensation can be awarded for
services that are purely gratuitous in nature).
307. It is questionable whether third persons who have benefited from a donation
are answerable for this benefit under the theory of enrichment without cause. The
answer is clearly negative if the third person is an intended beneficiary. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 1978. The issue, however, is not as straightforward if the third
person is an incidental beneficiary. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Nancy, Apr. 29, 1893, S. 95, 2, 209 (Fr.) (awarding compensation to plaintiff who
donated money to a religious community for improvements made to a school
operated by the community but owned by a local municipality that later took over
the operation of the school and was sued by plaintiff on theory of enrichment
without cause); see also McWilliams v. Hagan, 4 Rob. 374, 376 (La. 1843) (“In the
absence of any privity [between plaintiff and defendant], a very strong case must be
made out, to justify the application of the maxim, that no man should be permitted
to enrich himself at the expense of another, as a ground of recovery.”).
308. See Kiper v. Kiper, 38 So. 2d 507 (La. 1948); Succession of Berthelot, 24
So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Latour v. Guillory, 64 So. 130 (La. 1914); see
also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
309. Hanger One MLU, Inc. v. Unopened Succession of Rogers, 981 So. 2d
175 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing unjustified enrichment claim of plaintiff who
provided gratuitous services for collection and storage of defendants’ damaged
aircraft in hopes of securing a lease of a hangar from the defendants who
eventually refused to lease to plaintiff).
310. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1762(1). See LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN
GENERAL, supra note 97, § 2.5.
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courts steadily dismiss claims of enrichment without cause when a
personal action has prescribed.311
ii-c. Quasi-Contracts
The more specific provisions governing negotiorum gestio312 and
restoration of a payment of a thing not due313 also will exclude recovery
on the basis of the more general action for enrichment without cause.
Similarly, a claim of enrichment without cause can compensate314 for an
adverse enrichment claim, thus providing justification for retention of
“counter-enrichments.” For instance, a purported business partner’s
unjustified enrichment claim for making improvements to his putative
partner’s building was offset by an adverse unjustified enrichment claim
of the latter partner for the former partner’s exclusive use of the
building.315
ii-d. Judicial Decisions
Civilian theory accepts that judicial decisions can constitute lawful
justification for retention of the enrichment.316 Thus, if a decision is
311. See, e.g., Dugas v. Thompson, 71 So. 3d 1059 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
312. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292.
313. Id. art. 2299.
314. Id. art. 1893.
315. Munro v. Carstensen, 945 So. 2d 961, 966 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
316. An example is the judicial determination of the liability of solidary obligors.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1804 cmt. b; LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL,
supra note 97, §§ 7.78–7.82; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 3e civ., Nov. 14, 1973, Bull civ. III, No. 580 (Fr.) (holding that the
lower court’s judicial allocation of responsibility among two solidary obligors
constituted “just cause” that prevented any claim of unjustified enrichment made by
the obligor who was charged with the larger virile portion). Cf. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co.
v. Deaton, Inc., 581 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App 1991); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Standard Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 So. 2d 463 (La. Ct. App 1941) (both holding that a joint
tortfeasor who only is statutorily liable and makes payment to injured party has a
quasi-contractual right of contribution against the responsible tortfeasor); see also
Scott v. Wesley, 589 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (“[I]n cases where a claim has
been exercised and a judgment obtained, it is most apparent that there is a practical
remedy available at law,” precluding application of the theory of enrichment without
cause.); Gasaway–Bankston v. C.P. Land, L.L.C., No. 2014-CA-1749, 2015 WL
3548099, at *3 (La. Ct. App. June 5, 2015) (dismissing architectural firm’s unjustified
enrichment claim against the buyer of the immovable because the architectural firm
had already secured a judgment against the developer for the full amount owed under
the contract).
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overturned on appeal, there is no lawful justification for retaining
payments made on the basis of the overturned decision.317
b. Absence of Other Remedy: Subsidiarity of the Action
Enrichment without cause is a subsidiary remedy, meaning that this
action is admissible only when there is no other available remedy at law.318
This juridical requirement has been debated in several civilian jurisdictions,
including Louisiana.319 The controversy stems from the fact that there is a
great degree of overlap between lack of cause and subsidiarity. Some writers
argue that a proper understanding of cause should provide adequate
guidance to the courts, which instead rely too heavily on the subsidiary
nature of this remedy.320 Other writers, as well as the prevailing
jurisprudence in France and Louisiana, consider subsidiarity the prevalent

317. City Fin. Corp. v. Bonnie, 762 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
debtor responsible for restitution but not debtor’s attorney who had a cause for
retaining the funds as attorney’s fees). But see also Phipps v. Chesson, 682 So. 2d
935, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Stegall v. Orr Motors of Little Rock, Inc., 165 So.
3d 264, 268 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (both holding that amounts paid in excess of a
judgment are subject to restitution).
318. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 ; cf. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art.
1303-3 (2018) (Fr.).
319. Subsidiarity of this action is accepted, with variations, in most civilian
jurisdictions, but not without debate. See Alexis Posez, La subsidiarité de
l’enrichissement sans cause: étude de droit français à la lumière du droit
comparé, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 185 (2014); see also P.
Drakidis, La “subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et international de l’action
d’enrichissement sans cause, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV]
1961, p. 577, 589 (characterizing this requirement as “equivocal”); G. Viney, note
under Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June
3, 1997, JCP 1998, II, 10102 (Fr.) (arguing that this requirement is “obscure”).
The initial draft of Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as proposed by the
Quasi-Contracts Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, had eliminated
subsidiarity as a requirement. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Editor’s note under article
2298, in WEST’S LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, VOL. I (2017); Martin, supra note 1, at
69; Oakes, supra note 303, at 900 n.175.
320. See Tate I, supra note 113, at 888–89; Martin, supra note 1, at 69.
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juridical requirement321 while acknowledging that there is some overlap
with the lack of cause.322
The truth lies somewhere in the middle.323 The overlap between lack
of cause and subsidiarity is considerable but not complete. Subsidiarity
coincides with lack of cause whenever there is a lawful justification for
retention of the enrichment. Indeed, if a juridical act or the law furnishes
title for retention of the enrichment, the action for unjustified enrichment
will fail predominantly because of the lack of cause.324 Also, when the law
provides for a more specific remedy, such as in the case of a null juridical
act or the dissolution of a contract, these provisions will supply the rule of
decision as lex specialis.325 In such cases, the requirement of subsidiarity
is redundant because justification of the enrichment or the existence of
more special legal rules will exclude the action anyway.326
321. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 243, 244 (La.
2010); Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v. La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72,
80–81 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc.,
818 So. 2d 12, 19 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (all finding that “where there is a rule of
law directed to the issue, an action must not be allowed to defeat the purpose of
said rule . . . stated differently, unjust enrichment principles are only applicable to
fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is provided.”); Nicholas II, supra
note 91, at 66 (noting that the requirement of subsidiarity existed in the early, preMinyard Louisiana jurisprudence); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., June 18, 2014, JCP 2014, 998, note G. Loiseau (Fr.); P.
Rémy, Le principe de subsidiarité de l’action de in rem verso en droit français, in
L’ENRICHISSEMENT SANS CAUSE. LA CLASSIFICATION DES SOURCES DES
OBLIGATIONS 59 (V. Mannino & C. Ophèle eds., 2007).
322. See MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 706; Drakidis, supra note 319,
at 577; Schewe & Richelle, supra note 113, 663, 666–70 (arguing in favor of the
subsidiarity principle despite the overlap with lack of cause).
323. Subsidiarity, as a requirement, appeared in the writings of AUBRY & RAU,
supra note 6, No. 578, but it was adopted by French jurisprudence as a reaction to
the rather extensive holding in the Boudier case. See Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] civ., May 12, 1914, S. 1918, 1, 41 (Fr.); Cour
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., Mar. 2, 1915, D. 1920,
1, 102 (Fr.); Rouast, supra note 163, at 35–40; 2 PLANIOL I, supra note 65, No. 935.
324. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; MARTY & RAYNAUD,
supra note 81, No. 354; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710.
325. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710.
326. FLOUR ET AL., FAIT JURIDIQUE, supra note 90, No. 54. See 2 PLANIOL I,
supra note 65, No. 937A, at 550 (“In reality, if in these different cases, the action
de in rem verso does not lie, it is because the relations of the parties, being fixed
by the contract or by the legal rule of responsibility, there is no need to make use
of the concept of unjust enrichment. The person enriched has the right to keep the
enrichment, and the measure in which he is held is determined by the application
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The subsidiarity rule actually comes into play when there is no
justification for the retention of the enrichment, but there is still another
available remedy at law.327 French scholars, however, do not mention any
concrete examples of such a situation.328 It is submitted that actions in
delict or quasi-delict are the main cases in which the rule of subsidiarity is
not overshadowed by the requirement of lack of cause. For instance, in a
case of a tort by conversion, the tortfeasor has no justification for retaining
the thing, yet the victim has an action in tort that precludes an action for
enrichment without cause pursuant to the subsidiarity rule. It is further
submitted that, although the cases of delict and quasi-delict present
examples of direct application of the subsidiarity rule, subsidiarity seems
impractical here. Indeed, a litigant would be ill-advised to pursue mere
restitution on the basis of enrichment without cause instead of seeking
redress and full recovery by application of the law of damages.329 Further,
the preference in favor of the delictual action is better achieved through
application of the civilian maxim lex specialis derogat lege generali.330
Thus, the debate on subsidiarity presents a false dilemma. Be that as it
may, the jurisprudence overwhelmingly endorses this rule.331
of other juridical rules.”). This approach is gaining support in Greek
jurisprudence. See Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 859/2003, ELLINIKI
DIKAIOSYNI (HELLENIC JUSTICE JOURNAL) 2004, p. 144 (Greece) (“[S]ubsidiarity
is not an additional requirement for an unjustified enrichment claim. It simply
derives from . . . the basis of the claim for unjustified enrichment, which is the
lack of legal cause.”).
327. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 164, No. 710.
328. Id. But see Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 14–26 (discussing variable
situations in which the question of subsidiary may arise).
329. One plausible, albeit theoretical, explanation could be the plaintiff’s
inability to establish liability on the part of the tortfeasor. See STATHOPOULOS,
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 126, at 248; Nicholas III, supra note 113, at 15.
Especially with respect to the Louisiana tort of conversion, see supra note 231.
330. “The special law overrides the general law.” See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 239; see also Posez, supra note 319, at 185. When
a delictual action is available, application of the special rules for a shorter
prescription of the delictual action also will apply and establish a natural obligation
serving as the lawful cause for the enrichment. See supra notes 304, 311.
331. MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 81, No. 354. The accessory nature of the
actio de in rem verso is appealing to French and Louisiana judges because it also
achieves a necessary “economy of means” in civil procedure. See BÉNABENT,
supra note 110, No. 485. Conversely, an action for a payment of a thing not due
is rightly characterized as an independent, not subsidiary, action. A good
illustration of the need for this distinction can be found in the case of an
enrichment ob turpem vel injustam causam. In the case of a tort of conversion, for
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Enrichment without cause, therefore, is excluded when the
impoverished plaintiff can seek another remedy. This alternative remedy
can be legal,332 contractual,333 quasi-contractual,334 delictual,335 or quasidelictual.336 Usually, the available action will be directed against the
enriched party.337 It is possible, however, that the existence of a remedy
against a third party, that is, a person other than the enriched, will exclude

example, two separate causes of action can be contemplated—that of the tort
itself, which is subject to a liberative prescription of one year; and that for the
claim of restitution of the thing as a “thing not due,” which is subject to a ten-year
prescriptive period. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2299 cmt. c (2018); see also
Whitten v. Monkhouse, 29 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Cumis Ins. Soc’y,
Inc. v. Hill, 574 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. La. 1983).
332. An example would be a claim for child support payments or fulfillment
of other parental obligations. See Vaccari v. Vaccari, 50 So. 3d 139, 142 (La.
2010); Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d 290, 295–96 (La. 2000); State Dep’t. of
Children and Family Servs. v. Charles, 131 So. 3d 1054, 1058 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
For other examples from the Louisiana Revised Statutes, see supra note 298.
333. Audio Plus, Inc. v. Lombardino, 105 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
(contract for remodeling); Pinnacle Operating Co. v. Ettco Enter., Inc., 914 So.
2d 1144 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (contract of assignment of rights); Hall v. James, 986
So. 2d 817 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (mineral lease); Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 24, 1973, Bull. civ. I No. 280
(Fr.) (contract of assignment of rights); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] com., Apr. 23, 2013, JurisData 7881 (Fr.) (services contract);
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 1 Feb.,
1989, JurisData 399 (Fr.) (contract of lease). This should include actions
stemming from the nullity or dissolution of a contract.
334. See Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of
Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REV. 69, 99–102 (1993) (arguing that
a co-owner’s action for enrichment without cause is subordinate to an existing
action in negotiorum gestio); see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 16, 2004, JurisData 22990 (Fr.) (negotiorum
gestio); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July
5, 1989, JurisData 702693 (Fr.) (payment of a thing not due).
335. Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 245 (La. 2010); Cour
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 28, 1982, JurisData 20867 (Fr.).
336. The alternative remedy may also include breach of the duty of good faith
and fiduciary duties. See Westbrook v. Pike Elec., L.L.C., 799 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D.
La. 2011); Zaveri v. Condor Petroleum Corp., 27 F. Supp. 3d 695 (W.D. La. 2014).
337. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Oct. 24, 1973, Bull. civ. I, No. 280 (Fr.).
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the action of enrichment without cause.338 The term “remedy” has been
construed broadly to include not only personal but also real actions.339
But it may happen that the action the plaintiff normally has against her
direct debtor cannot be exercised because of a factual obstacle that is
beyond the plaintiff’s control or without any negligence on her part. When
that is the case, the requirement of subsidiarity is waived, and the plaintiff
will be allowed to bring the actio de in rem verso against the party holding
the enrichment if the other requirements for the action are met.340
Insolvency of the debtor is a usual example of such a factual obstacle. 341
When allowing the action in such cases, French courts have scrutinized
closely the obligee’s duty of good faith. Thus, courts have refused the

338. See Soileau v. ABC Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 108, 111 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (client
who had a claim against accountant could not sue third person for restitution of funds
embezzled by accountant and given to third person); Coastal Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v.
Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 818 So. 2d 12, 19–20 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (environmental
cleanup company had a remedy at law against lessee that contaminated soil that
precluded company’s claim of unjust enrichment against lessor); Insulation Techs.,
Inc. v. Indus. Labor & Equip. Servs., Inc., 122 So. 3d 1146, 1151 (La. Ct. App. 2013)
(existence of contractual remedy against general contractor precluded subcontractor
from maintaining cause of action for unjust enrichment against the owner of the
project); see also Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Broadmoor, L.L.C.,
111 So. 3d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Pinegrove Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Cat Key
Constr., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1097 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. v.
La. Agric. Fin. Auth., 984 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (availability of remedy under
the Public Works Act precludes a claim for enrichment without cause).
339. Finova Cap. Corp. v. IT Corp., 774 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff who held security interest in subcontractor’s equipment had
other available remedies, including foreclosing on equipment and seeking writ of
sequestration); Builders Supply of Ruston, Inc. v. Qualls, 750 So. 2d 427, 431 (La. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding that supplier of building materials failed to avail himself of
statutory rights and remedies governing claims and privileges). See Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. Jessen, 732 So. 2d 699, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that contractor
failed to take measures to secure his claim of unpaid fee for constructing a house).
340. 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 763; Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] req., Nov. 23, 1908, S. 1910, 1, 425, note
Naquet (Fr.) (holding that the actio de in rem verso must fail if a justification for
retention of the enrichment exists in a contract between the third party and the
original insolvent debtor).
341. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan.
14, 2003, JurisData 17242, DEFRENOIS 2003, p. 259, obs. J.-L. Aubert, REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 2003, p. 295, obs. J. Mestre et B. Fages
(Fr.). See Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 640.
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action when the plaintiff, out of gross negligence, neglected to secure her
claim or to bring suit prior to her debtor’s insolvency.342
This exception does not apply, however, when the plaintiff’s alternative
remedy is barred because of a legal obstacle. In such a case, subsidiarity is
not waived and the action for enrichment without cause must fail. Liberative
prescription of the alternative action is the prime example of a legal
obstacle.343 Res judicata is another example.344 Arguably, failure to produce
evidence to sustain an alternative remedy is a third example.345 The mere

342. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req. July 11,
1889, S. 1890, 1, 97, note Labbé (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] civ. Feb. 12, 1923, 1, 129, note Rouast (Fr.). This opinion is also
supported in doctrine. See 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 164, No. 762.
343. See, e.g., Dugas v. Thompson, 71 So. 3d 1059 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
Especially for the case of liberative prescription, explanation for the exclusion of
the action can be found in the theory of cause, given that a prescribed action
constitutes a natural obligation. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1762 (2018). But see
Nicholas I, supra note 11, at 636–39 (discussing the difficulties in distinguishing a
“legal” obstacle from a “factual” one).
344. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May
27, 2010, REVUE JURIDIQUE PERSONNES ET FAMILLE [RJPF] 2010, p. 20, obs. T. Garé
(Fr.) (holding that, if the preclusive effect of a divorce decree does not extend to
patrimonial issues, a claim of enrichment without cause would be admissible).
345. See, e.g., Troxler v. Breaux, 105 So. 3d 944, 949–50 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
(failure of a plaintiff cohabitant to produce evidence of an agreement for shared
costs with defendant cohabitant did not provide grounds for an action in enrichment
without cause); Johnson v. State, 510 So. 2d 87, 90–92 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(employee failed to prove a cause of action for workers’ compensation); Current
French jurisprudence, however, seems split on this issue. Compare Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 3 1997, JCP 1998
II 10102, note G. Viney (Fr.) (actio de in rem verso allowed although plaintiff had
failed to prove delictual fault), with Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 31, 2011, JurisData 4877, D. 2011, p. 2891, obs. I.
Gelbard-Le Dauphin (Fr.) (dismissing an actio de in rem verso of a plaintiff who
had failed to produce evidence of the existence of a loan agreement). Courts
sometimes have relied erroneously on this solution, however, when the exclusion of
the action should be sought on other grounds. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Apr. 29, 197, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT CIVIL [RTDCIV] 1971, p. 872, obs. Loussouarn (Fr.) (providing that
contractor’s unjustified enrichment claim against his former concubine for
improvements he made to defendant’s property was dismissed because of his
inability to produce evidence of the existence of a contract). Perhaps a better
explanation would have been that the plaintiff’s liberality served as a cause for the
defendant’s enrichment. Be that as it may, this case also illustrates the great degree
of overlap between cause and subsidiarity.
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existence of an alternative remedy, and not the remedy’s likelihood of
success, will suffice.346
These variations in the jurisprudence should be seen as evidence of
the functional role of subsidiarity, which is the only aspect that realistically
sets it apart from lack of cause.347 Indeed, as an instrument of equity, the
actio de in rem verso must be deployed when not doing so would bring
about an unfair result. Although it may seem contrary to equity to allow a
plaintiff who fails to present proof for her cause of action to be heard on
different grounds, sometimes resorting to equity may be excused, even in
such circumstances.348
Finally, the rule of subsidiarity, as crafted by French and Louisiana
jurisprudence, is substantive rather than procedural. Thus, the plaintiff is
precluded from bringing an action for enrichment without cause when
another remedy is available. It should not mean, however, that the same
plaintiff should be precluded from pleading enrichment without cause in
the alternative. In fact, the litigant is only charged with presenting the facts
of the case, which are characterized appropriately by the court, pursuant
to the long standing civilian maxim iura novit curia.349 Although this is

346. See Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 100 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]t
is not the success or failure of other causes of the action, but rather the existence of
other causes of action, that determine whether unjust enrichment can be applied.”).
347. See Tate II, supra note 113, at 466 (“In an action by an impoverished
plaintiff against a defendant enriched without legal justification, subsidiarity has
functional value.”).
348. See also Rémy, supra note 321, at 59–60; Y.-M. Laithier, observations
under Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June
25, 2008, JurisData 44518, REVUE DES CONTRATS 2008, No. 4, p. 1138 (Fr.).
349. “The court knows the law.” See Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v. Hot Energy
Servs., Inc., 907 So. 2d 96, 101 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (“Although Gulfstream did
not plead enrichment without cause by name, Louisiana remains a fact pleading
state and ‘[n]o technical forms of pleading are required.’ LA. C.C.P. art. 854;
Baker v. Maclay Props. Co., 648 So. 2d 888, 896–97 (La. 1995), . . . . Thus, the
threshold inquiry is whether Gulfstream pled or raised, without objection, a claim
for enrichment without cause.”).
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clearly the case in France350 and Greece,351 it only appears to be the case
in Louisiana.352
This overview of the requirements of enrichment without cause under
the lens of its true general characteristics reveals a falsehood: Enrichment
without cause is not a gap filling device. It is a remedy for restitution that
is more scarcely deployed because of the broad conception of restoration
and restitution on the basis of the doctrines of cause and nullity.
CONCLUSION
Civilian equity is not a separate branch of the law, living outside the
civil code.353 Equity permeates the civil law system in the form of long
standing general principles of the law. It is true that unjustified enrichment
is one of these fundamental principles of equity. It is partly true that
unjustified enrichment and enrichment without cause are one and the
same. Rather, enrichment without cause is only one expression of the
principle of unjustified enrichment. The doctrines of cause and nullity also
express this principle by virtue of several specific legal rules. It is a sheer
falsehood that enrichment without cause, formerly actio de in rem verso,
“intruded” the Civil Code as a judge-made device and must therefore be
350. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
June 23, 2010, JurisData 9986, REVUE DES CONTRATS 2010, No. 4, p. 1370, obs.
C. Goldie-Genicon (Fr.).
351. Also, nothing should prevent a defendant from arguing enrichment
without cause as a defense in the form of an exception. Justification for this
conclusion can be found in a long-standing Roman maxim allowing the defendant
to use a subordinate action as a shield instead of a sword. See DIG. 50.17.156.1
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 70) (“It has been said that a[n] [exception] falls even more
readily to someone to whom we grant actions.”) and 43.18.1.4 (Ulpian, Ad
Edictum 70) (“For when we grant an action to anyone, he will be considered all
the more entitled to a[n] [exception].”); BALIS, supra note 65, § 136, at 362–63.
352. Perez v. Util. Constructors, Inc., 2016 WL 5930877, at *2 n.5 (E.D. La.
Oct. 12, 2016) (“The Court acknowledges that there appears to be a degree of
confusion on this issue. Some sections of this Court have held that unjust
enrichment can never be pled in the alternative, while other sections have held
that alternative pleading is permissible.” (citing Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana,
702 So. 2d 648, 658 (La. 1996))). In Carriere, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
discussed plaintiffs’ claims for enrichment without cause which were pleaded in
the alternative to contract claims without dismissing claim because of the
alternative pleading). Carriere, 702 So. 2d at 671–74.
353. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, supra note 96, at 182 (“In
Louisiana and in France, there is no formal division between strict law and equity. .
. . Equity is built into the law.”).
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kept in austere confinement. In fact, this remains one of the most longlived misunderstandings in the law, dating back to Domat and Savigny.
This Article attempts to reintroduce enrichment without cause,
through a historical, critical, and comparative examination of its scope of
application. It is hoped that Louisiana doctrine and the jurisprudence will
engage in further discourse, leading to a Louisiana model of enrichment
without cause devoid of mysteries. Finally, it is true, sadly, that the
“Beautiful Civil Law of Louisiana,”354 enriched by the monumental work
of one of her most prolific admirers—Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos—is
now impoverished by his passing. We pay tribute to our departed teacher,
colleague, and friend, as we continue to guard Thermopylae.355

354. A.N. Yiannopoulos, On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana Supreme Court:
Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful Legal Tradition, 74 LA. L. REV.
649, 651 (2014).
355. Id. at 649, introductory footnote.

